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WHISTLEBLOWING ATTORNEYS AND ETHICAL
INFRASTRUCTURES
ALEX B. LONG*
I. INTRODUCTION
The lament is an all-too-common one. New attorneys arrive at their
law firms and find little to no guidance from senior attorneys.1 They are
given tasks they are not fully prepared to handle alone and left to sink or
swim.2 The result, all too often, is incompetent representation.3

Copyright © 2009 by Alex B. Long.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. Thanks to Ted
Schneyer, Carl Pierce, Anthony Davis, and Andrew Perlman for their helpful comments on an
earlier draft and to the participants at the Third Annual Colloquium on Current Scholarship in
Labor & Employment Law, especially Tim Glynn. Thanks to Peter Ferrell for his research
assistance on this Article. Thanks also to Will Kittrell and Michelle Gilbert for their assistance.
1. See Paul H. Burton, What Money Can’t Buy: Organic Mentoring in Law Firms, 43 ARIZ.
ATT‘Y 12, 13 (2007) (―Organic, mano a mano mentoring is all but extinct in today's frenetic legal
environment.‖); Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction,
Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REV. 239, 281–
83 (2000) (addressing the decline of mentoring at firms); Elizabeth K. McManus, Intimidation and
the Culture of Avoidance: Gender Issues and Mentoring in Law Firm Practice, 33 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 217, 220 (2005) (noting the particular problem of lack of mentoring for female
attorneys); Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School,
and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV. 705, 724–25 (1998) (noting
the isolation many new attorneys experience in their firms); James Regan, Note, How About a
Firm Where People Actually Want To Work?: A “Professional” Law Firm for the Twenty-First
Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2693, 2706 (2001) (stating that African-American associates often
cite the lack of mentoring as a reason for leaving a law firm).
2. See In re Yacavino, 494 A.2d 801, 803 (N.J. 1985) (per curiam) (―In the future . . . this
attitude of leaving new lawyers to ‗sink or swim‘ will not be tolerated.‖).
3. See, e.g., Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz, Ribicoff & Kotkin, 717 A.2d
724, 730 (Conn. 1998) (affirming a malpractice verdict against an associate for the associate‘s
failure to seek out supervision and noting the associate‘s defense that she ―‗assume[d] somebody
was . . . watching, taking care of looking at my work‘‖ (alteration in original)); In re Weston, 442
N.E.2d 236, 238, 240 (Ill. 1982) (disciplining supervising attorney for failing to supervise a
subordinate attorney who ignored a matter assigned to him to the detriment of the client); In re
Yacavino, 494 A.2d at 802, 804 (suspending junior attorney from the practice of law for three
years for forging documents to cover his negligent handling of a matter); In re Barry, 447 A.2d
923, 926 (N.J. 1982) (Clifford, J., dissenting) (placing part of blame for young attorney‘s
malpractice on law firm‘s failure to provide regular supervision); In re Myers, 584 S.E.2d 357,
360–61 (S.C. 2003) (per curiam) (disciplining supervising prosecuting attorney for failure to
supervise deputy who had failed to provide defense counsel with relevant information); Fortney,
supra note 1, at 282–83 (―Without mentoring, associates struggle to learn how to practice law
competently and ethically.‖); see also Lewis v. State Bar of Cal., 621 P.2d 258, 261–62 (Cal.
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This type of hands-off management style may have other
consequences. A law firm that takes little interest in the professional
development of its junior attorneys is likely to also be a law firm that lacks
a culture of ethical practice. Where incompetence is tolerated, it is likely
that other types of unethical practices are ignored and tacitly condoned.
Unfortunately, where a firm lacks an ethical infrastructure, an attorney may
lack any place to turn when the attorney observes unethical practices on the
part of another attorney or faces a difficult ethical dilemma himself or
herself.4 The absence of any meaningful internal policies or mechanisms to
which a subordinate attorney can turn in such instances places the attorney
in a difficult position. The attorney can ignore any ethical concerns he may
have, thereby contributing to the cycle of unethical practice within the firm
and the legal profession at large, or the attorney can raise concerns with
others either inside or outside the firm. The problem with the latter course
of action is that such action may expose the ―whistleblowing‖ attorney to
retaliation by the law firm and loss of employment.5
Rule 5.1 of the American Bar Association‘s (―ABA‖) Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (―Model Rules‖) requires law firm partners to make
reasonable efforts to supervise subordinate attorneys and to ensure that the
firm has internal measures in place that give ―reasonable assurance‖ that all
lawyers within the firm are complying with their ethical obligations.6
Despite the existence of these ethical duties, there is relatively little data
regarding law firm compliance measures.7 However, there are certainly
enough judicial decisions involving attorneys who have been fired for
blowing the whistle on unethical conduct8 and anecdotes from law firm
associates about the internal pressures within law firms to look the other

1981) (Bird, C.J., concurring) (stating that the burden of the duty of competence ―appears to fall
disproportionately on younger members of the legal profession who begin their careers as solo
practitioners‖); Douglas R. Richmond, Professional Responsibilities of Law Firm Associates, 45
BRANDEIS L.J. 199, 212–13 (2007) [hereinafter Richmond, Professional Responsibilities] (noting
the unwillingness of courts to excuse associates‘ incompetence when it results from lack of
supervision).
4. The term ―ethical infrastructure‖ is most closely associated with Professor Ted Schneyer.
See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10 (1991)
(stating that ―a law firm's organization, policies, and operating procedures constitute an ‗ethical
infrastructure‘‖).
5. Richmond, Professional Responsibilities, supra note 3, at 247.
6. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a), (b) (2008).
7. See Elizabeth Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy in Law Firm Regulation Debates, 33
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 119, 131 (2005) [hereinafter Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy] (noting that
very little data exist on the ―prevalence of compliance specialists‖ within law firms).
8. See generally Alex B. Long, Retaliatory Discharge and the Ethical Rules Governing
Attorneys, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1043 (2008) [hereinafter Long, Retaliatory Discharge] (detailing
cases).
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way when confronted with ethical issues9 to lead one to suspect that
perhaps law firm compliance measures in this regard leave something to be
desired. As importantly, despite the duties present in Model Rule 5.1, the
reality is that law firm partners presently face little risk of disciplinary
action for their failure to develop meaningful ethical infrastructures.10
The failure of the legal profession to do more to require law firms to
develop ethical infrastructures that encourage the reporting, investigation,
and resolution of internal reports of unethical conduct and to protect
attorneys from retaliation when they report unethical conduct stands in
marked contrast to the current trend in other areas of the law. In the
employment discrimination field, the Supreme Court of the United States
has interpreted federal law broadly in order to protect employees from
retaliation when they complain about unlawful discrimination.11 The major
federal employment discrimination statutes provide protection from
retaliation for internal as well as external whistleblowers, and in some cases
the Court has held that employers are prohibited from retaliating against
employees who engage in protected whistleblowing activity even when the
anti-discrimination statute in question affords no explicit protection from
retaliation.12 In addition, the Court has given employers a strong legal
incentive to adopt internal reporting and investigation procedures that allow
employees to report suspected unlawful discrimination by granting
employers an affirmative defense that sometimes allows employers to avoid
liability for harassment committed by supervisors.13 Similarly, in the

9. See Susan Saab Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby: Empirical Data on the Problems and
Pressure Points, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171, 178 (2005) (quoting associate as saying ―I know
that my colleagues regularly falsely elevate their time entries‖).
10. See infra notes 106–115 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1936–37, 1943 (2008) (holding that the
federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act proscribes retaliation
against employees for filing age discrimination complaints); CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries,
128 S. Ct. 1951, 1954–55 (2008) (holding that the ―equal contract rights‖ provision of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 1981, encompasses complaints of retaliation); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57, 63–64 (2006) (finding that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not limited in scope to harms related to employment).
12. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov‘t, 129 S. Ct. 846, 849 (2009) (holding that Title VII‘s antiretaliation provision protects employees who answer questions as part of an employer‘s internal
investigation into a charge of harassment); Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1935–36 (holding that Age
Discrimination in Employment Act prohibited employer from retaliating against federal employee
who filed an administrative complaint of age discrimination despite the absence of a statutory
anti-retaliation provision); CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1954–55, 1957–58, 1961 (holding that
§ 1981 prohibited employer from retaliating against employee who complained to managers about
race discrimination despite the absence of a statutory anti-retaliation provision); see also Long,
Retaliatory Discharge, supra note 8, at 1085–86 (discussing Title VII‘s protection for those who
report wrongdoing internally as well as those who file formal discrimination charges with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
13. See infra notes304-05and accompanying text.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1447429

Long_PreliminaryBookProof(version2)

7/2/2009 10:12 AM

104

[VOL. 68:101

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

corporate law world, there have been major changes in federal law in recent
years requiring publicly traded corporations to develop more formal ethical
infrastructures and to adopt procedures to encourage internal reports of
wrongdoing.14
Yet, the legal profession, for whatever reasons, has chosen not to
follow suit. The Model Rules do not speak directly to the issue of
whistleblower protection for attorneys who report unethical conduct to
disciplinary authorities. In addition, it appears that law firms have made
only modest attempts to encourage firm attorneys to report suspected
wrongdoing internally. In the summer of 2008, I conducted a survey of law
firms regarding the measures they have taken to ensure that all attorneys
within their firms are practicing in an ethical manner in accordance with
Rule 5.1.15 Of the 156 responding firms, only 15% reported that they had a
written policy encouraging attorneys to notify someone within the firm
about suspected unethical conduct on the part of another attorney.
The legal profession prides itself on the role it plays in the
administration of justice and the fact that it is a self-governing profession.16
A profession that is truly serious about protecting those it serves from the
harmful consequences of unethical conduct would adopt a system that
would hold employers accountable when they have failed to adopt
reasonable measures designed to prevent and detect potentially harmful
14. See infra notes281-82and accompanying text.
15. The survey was a regional one, focusing on Tennessee. The survey was distributed to 710
law firms in the cities with the highest populations in the state: Memphis, Nashville, Knoxville,
Chattanooga, Murfreesboro, Clarksville, and the Tri-Cities area (Bristol, Kingsport, and Johnson
City). Initially, an attempt was made to distribute the survey to an appropriate individual at every
law firm in Memphis, Nashville, Knoxville, and Chattanooga—by far the four largest cities in the
state—by using information contained in the Tennessee Attorney‘s Directory or available online.
Eventually, I also attempted to distribute the survey electronically to an appropriate individual at
law firms in Murfreesboro, Clarksville, and the Tri-Cities area in order to provide a more
representative sample of the state. The survey consisted of thirteen questions that respondents
could answer online at a secure site. When e-mail addresses were available, the survey was
distributed by e-mail. I later sent out a follow-up letter and survey by mail to the same
individuals. Where e-mail addresses were not available, the survey was distributed by mail. One
hundred fifty-six firms responded, making the response rate 22%. Like most surveys which are
confined to a particular market, the most significant drawbacks to this survey are its small sample
size and its confinement to one legal market. For example, the percentage of respondents from
law firms consisting of over 100 attorneys was 4.5%, a higher percentage than exists on a national
level (.7%) according to a 2000 American Bar Foundation study. CLARA N. CARSON, AM. BAR
FOUND., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 2000, at 30 (2004).
Because that 4.5% consists of only seven law firms, however, it would obviously be unwise to
draw any firm conclusions about the ethical infrastructures that exist more generally on a
nationwide basis.
16. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT pmbl., cl. 6 (2008) (―As a public citizen, a
lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of
justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession.‖); id. cl. 11, 12 (noting the selfgoverning nature of the legal profession and stating that ―[a]n independent legal profession is an
important force in preserving government under law‖).
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conduct. It would also promote the most efficient means of bringing
misconduct to light and afford protection to those who do so. Currently, the
legal profession does none of those things. Therefore, this Article will
advocate for a change. More specifically, this Article will examine the duty
of law firm partners to help ensure that lawyers within the firm are engaged
in the ethical practice of law and the plight of would-be whistleblowers
when firm partners fail to live up to this duty.
Part II will discuss the role that a law firm‘s ethical infrastructure—or
lack thereof—may have on encouraging attorneys to make internal and
external reports of suspected unethical conduct and the various reasons why
attorneys (and particularly junior attorneys) often fail to make such reports.
Part III will discuss the scope of a law firm partner‘s ethical obligations to
help develop internal structures to encourage such reporting and the various
shortcomings of the current ethical structure regarding the reporting of
suspected professional misconduct and the protection of whistleblowing
lawyers. Part III also will relate the results of the 2008 survey of law firms
concerning their attempts to comply with Rule 5.1 and to encourage the
internal reporting of unethical conduct. Part IV will offer several
suggestions as to how the legal profession could do more to encourage law
firms to promote the ethical practice of law while protecting would-be
whistleblowers. In addition to proposing several interpretations of existing
ethical rules, this Part will look to developments in the corporate and
employment discrimination law fields in suggesting the addition of several
new ethical rules to encourage attorneys to make internal reports of
suspected unethical conduct and to protect those attorneys who make
internal and external reports of suspected unethical conduct.
II. ETHICAL INFRASTRUCTURES AND WHISTLEBLOWING ATTORNEYS
A. The Influence of a Firm’s Ethical Infrastructure on Individual
Attorneys
The explanations for incompetent and unethical lawyering are
limitless. One recurring theme, however, is that the culture and structure of
a law firm may have a profound influence on the professional ethics of its
individual lawyers. In 1991, Professor Ted Schneyer famously advanced
the proposition that a law firm‘s ―ethical infrastructure‖—its ―organization,
policies, and operating procedures‖—may be at least as likely to be the
cause of unethical conduct and professional malpractice as ―the individual
values and practice skills‖ of the attorneys who make up the firm. 17 In
other words, the failure of a firm to develop internal mechanisms that help

17. Schneyer, supra note 4, at 10.
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prevent, identify, and root out unethical practices may permit such practices
to flourish.
The increasing complexity of not just the law in general but also the
law governing lawyers makes it difficult for even experienced lawyers to
always understand their ethical responsibilities.18 But the lack of adequate
internal mechanisms within a law firm to address potential ethical problems
may have particular consequences for newer lawyers. It is now almost an
article of faith among law school graduates that legal education does an
inadequate job of preparing young lawyers for the ―real world‖ of the
practice of law.19 And it is almost an equally common refrain that law
firms do a poor job of supervising and instructing new attorneys on the
practice of law.20 As an example, Professor Susan Saab Fortney cites the
failure of law firms to provide training on billing matters, an area obviously
fraught with potential ethical peril.21 According to Fortney‘s 2000 survey
of law firm associates, only 14% of respondents indicated that they received
more than two hours of training on billing matters and 26% reported that
they received no training whatsoever.22 It is not just in the area of training
on billing that the ethical infrastructure of some law firms may be lacking.
Less than half of the respondents to Fortney‘s survey reported that their
firms had written billing guidelines, and roughly a quarter replied that they
did not know whether their firms had written guidelines.23
Professors Elizabeth Chambliss and David B. Wilkins have devoted
significant time to studying the ethical infrastructures of law firms, 24 and
they generally find firms wanting. Professor Chambliss concludes:

18. See Anthony E. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management: Complementary Visions of
Lawyer Regulation, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 115 (2008) (stating that ―law school graduates
who have taken a basic professional responsibility course and who have passed the MPRE
generally have only the most basic understanding of‖ legal ethics); Jonathan M. Epstein, The InHouse Ethics Advisor: Practical Benefits for the Modern Law Firm, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1011, 1029 (1994) (―While every lawyer has an obligation to be familiar with the current ethical
rules in his or her jurisdiction, this becomes practically impossible, especially if resources are not
readily available.‖).
19. See Amy B. Cohen, The Dangers of the Ivory Tower: The Obligation of Law Professors
to Engage in the Practice of Law, 50 LOY. L. REV. 623, 630 (2004) (explaining responses to a
survey revealing that practicing lawyers believed most frequently that legal education should do
more to prepare students for the practical aspects of law practice); Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to
Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 681 (1990) (―Most new lawyers realize that there is a wide gulf
between what they learn in their ethics classes and what happens in the world of practice.‖).
20. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
21. Fortney, supra note 1, at 253–54.
22. Id. at 254 & n.87.
23. Id. at 253.
24. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical
Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691
(2002) [hereinafter Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure] (providing
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[R]esearch suggests that most law firms do a relatively poor job
of monitoring firm-wide compliance with professional regulation.
For instance, while most firms have formal procedures for
identifying conflicts of interest, many firms lack formal
procedures for addressing other ethical issues, such as lawyers‘
investment in clients‘ businesses and the withdrawal of client
funds.25
Anecdotally, numerous decisions recount the tales of newer attorneys
left to navigate difficult ethical waters with little to no supervision from
supervising attorneys.26 Of course, in some instances, the cases involve
young attorneys whose moral compasses may already have been defective.
In such cases, the failure of any meaningful compliance policies or
procedures within the firm simply made it possible for the attorneys‘
incompetent and unethical practices to go undetected. But it is not difficult
to imagine situations in which a newer attorney, left alone and with no
guidance, confronts a difficult issue and in good faith tries, but fails, to act
in a competent and ethical manner.
The failure of a law firm to adopt any meaningful policies or
procedures to encourage the ethical practice of law may have broader
consequences. Over time, organizations develop their own cultures, which
may shape the values of those within the organization.27 At the beginning
of a lawyer‘s career in a law firm, it is natural to look to others to develop a
sense of the prevailing norms within the organization.28 Recent law school
graduates in particular look ―up and around‖ in order to learn what is
expected of them.29 And, as Professor Lisa G. Lerman has suggested, these

an example of Professors Chambliss and Wilkins‘s research and analysis of the ―ethical
infrastructure‖ within law firms).
25. Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy, supra note 7, at 127–28.
26. See, e.g., In re Cohen, 847 A.2d 1162, 1166 (D.C. 2004) (involving a law firm in which
―there was no system in place to impart rudimentary ethics training to lawyers in the firm,
particularly the less experienced ones‖ and the ―lack of a review mechanism which allowed an
associate's work to be reviewed and guided by a supervisory attorney‖); Ky. Bar Ass‘n v.
Weinberg, 198 S.W.3d 595, 596–97 (Ky. 2006) (involving an attorney who delegated a case to
another attorney, who allowed the statute of limitations to run and then delegated the case to a
subordinate attorney); supra note 3 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Christine Parker et al., The Ethical Infrastructure of Legal Practice in Larger
Law Firms: Values, Policy and Behaviour, 31 U.N.S.W. L.J 158, 163–64 (2008) (―Research
demonstrates that bureaucratic corporate structures influence the ethical vision of those within
them.‖); Milton C. Regan Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
941, 942 (2007) (discussing how an organizational culture shapes individual values).
28. Lerman, supra note 19, at 681.
29. Kimberly Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms: The Principle of Pragmatism, 35 U.
MEM. L. REV. 631, 643 (2005).
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new associates may not be particularly critical of the ethical norms they are
expected to mirror given their desire to succeed within the firm. 30
Drawing upon social psychology research, Professor Andrew Perlman
has recently argued persuasively that many of the situational factors that
contribute to conformity in terms of decision-making are present in the
practice of law.31 Perlman defines ―conformity‖ among professionals in
terms of the suppression of ―independent judgment in favor of a group‘s
opinion‖ and the lack of ―resistance in the face of illegal or unethical
demands.‖32 One factor associated with such conformity is the extent to
which an ethical issue contains ambiguity and uncertainty. Legal ethics
questions are often laden with ambiguity and, even when they are not, no
one is as capable of ―identifying (or manufacturing)‖ ambiguity as a
lawyer.33 Accordingly, Perlman concludes that ―lawyers are especially
susceptible to the forces of conformity,‖ including organizational structures
in which superiors hold long-term power over subordinates (such as the
power firm partners possess over the career prospects of associates) and the
lack of social status among subordinates, who are more likely to conform to
protect their vulnerable positions.34 This may be particularly true in midsized and larger law firms where junior lawyers often work in teams under
the supervision of a partner.35 Not surprisingly then, the realities of law
firm practice may contribute strongly to the lack of independent decisionmaking and dissent among junior attorneys.
B. Internal Procedures for Reporting Misconduct and Whistleblowing
Attorneys
Then, Paul realized how futile all this was. What were his
choices? He could confront Calvin Morris, the best litigator at
Stuyvesant & Main. As he thought about it, he realized that the
conversation was a non-starter. Paul couldn’t even imagine
having the nerve to open his mouth. And what words would he

30. Lerman, supra note 19, at 681. Professor Kimberly Kirkland has argued that large-firm
lawyers are even more likely to adopt the norms of other firm attorneys than are attorneys in midsized and smaller law firms because large-firm attorneys spend much of their careers doing work
for many different attorneys. Kirkland, supra note 29, at 637.
31. Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience by Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons from Social
Psychology, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 451, 451–52 (2007).
32. Id. at 453.
33. Id. at 460.
34. Id. at 460–61.
35. See Parker et al., supra note 27, at 168 (―[W]here a team works closely together on a dayto-day basis it can be very difficult for individuals to step outside of that shared culture and
question the ethics of a particular practice or decision . . . .‖); Schneyer, supra note 4, at 8 (―Many,
perhaps most, of the tasks performed in large firms are assigned to teams.‖).
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utter? “Sir, you lied yesterday in court.” . . . All speeches Paul
could conjure ended with the same result: Paul’s prompt
departure from the firm.
Nor was there anyone else with whom he could talk. The client
had never even met Paul. Going to another partner was too
intimidating and, in any event, hopeless. Here was Paul, recently
celebrating his thirtieth birthday and still required to call all
partners by their last name . . . . No partner at Stuyvesant &
Main would break ranks to side with an associate. Not on a
36
question like this.
The failure of a law firm to develop a meaningful ethical infrastructure
may, as a practical matter, mean that professional misconduct will often go
unreported. A lawyer who observes another lawyer‘s misconduct faces a
difficult problem. According to Model Rule 8.3(a), ―[a] lawyer who knows
that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer‘s honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the
appropriate professional authority.‖37 There are any number of reasons
why a lawyer might be disinclined to report the misconduct of another
lawyer to disciplinary authorities. The lawyer might not ―know‖—a term
denoting actual knowledge under the Model Rules38—that the other lawyer
has engaged in the conduct in question. In other instances, the lawyer may
be unsure as to whether the conduct in question amounts to an ethical
violation at all, let alone one that raises a substantial question about the
other lawyer‘s fitness as a lawyer. These are concerns that could potentially
be addressed within a law firm through resort to some type of internal
process, such as referral to an ethics counsel or committee charged with the
responsibility of investigating such matters.39 In the absence of such a
mechanism, however, an attorney may be left without guidance and may all
too quickly conclude that the matter is not worth pursuing.
Aside from such rule-based reasons for not reporting misconduct,
many lawyers are reluctant to blow the whistle on other lawyers for both
practical and philosophical reasons. The general public has somewhat
mixed feelings about whistleblowers, and the legal profession, with the
value it places on maintaining confidences, perhaps takes a particularly dim

36. Lawrence J. Fox, I’m Just an Associate . . . at a New York Firm, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
939, 950 (2000).
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2008) (emphasis added).
38. Id. R. 1.0(f).
39. See Epstein, supra note 18, at 1029 (discussing the benefits of legal ethics specialists or
committees within law firms).
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view of such individuals.40 But these types of pressures may be
exacerbated by the absence of any type of ethical infrastructure to deal with
reporting issues. This may be especially true for more junior attorneys,
who may reasonably view the lack of any policy addressing the reporting of
unethical conduct as a strong signal that such reports—particularly where
they concern more senior attorneys—are unwelcome. Many large law firms
at least now have designated ethics attorneys or committees to deal with
ethics questions; however, in at least some firms, the designated individuals
view their assignments as a distraction from the actual practice of law.41 In
one survey, when asked about the role of a firm‘s ethics committee, a
respondent referred to the committee as the ―no business committee.‖42
Thus, some firms appear to do little more than pay lip service to the notion
of developing an ethical infrastructure. Where such is the case, a law firm
may, in the words of one author, ―convey the symbolic message that ethical
consultation is just one step above napping at one‘s desk‖ in terms of career
advancement for associates.43
The lack of such internal procedures for the handling of suspected
misconduct may be significant in terms of bringing the misconduct to light.
One recent empirical study suggests that employees prefer an internal
reporting option to an external reporting one, at least where the employee
believes that the internal report is likely to produce an appropriate
response.44 Whistleblowers of all stripes recognize the possibility that they
may be retaliated against by their employers and ostracized by their
coworkers.45 But, according to at least one study, external whistleblowers
are more likely to face these consequences than are internal
whistleblowers.46 Therefore, as rational actors, attorneys—and particularly
junior attorneys, who work in firms without any type of meaningful internal
40. See Long, Retaliatory Discharge, supra note 8, at 1045–46 (explaining how
whistleblowing lawyers ―face pressures unique to the practice of law‖).
41. Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy, supra note 7, at 128–29.
42. Carla Messikomer, Ambivalence, Contradiction, and Ambiguity: The Everyday Ethics of
Defense Litigators, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 739, 743 (1998).
43. Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in Corporate
Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 864 (1998).
44. Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping
Obligations, 97 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 28), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1114924.
45. See Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the
Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1053
(2004) (relating results of study finding that 82% of whistleblowers studied experienced
harassment after blowing the whistle and that ―many whistleblowers develop serious mental
illness, such as depression‖).
46. Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing:
Protecting the Interests of the Employee, the Organization, and Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 267,
301–02 (1991).
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reporting procedure—can frequently be expected to do nothing in the face
of unethical conduct.
A young lawyer‘s natural inclination toward inaction is likely only
intensified when the lawyer scans the legal landscape involving other
attorneys who have reported the misconduct of other attorneys. At the state
level, protection for whistleblowers varies dramatically from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. The majority of state statutes affording protection for
whistleblowers protect external whistleblowers who report to government
agencies but not those who make an internal report of wrongdoing.47 Some
jurisdictions have been willing to recognize a common law claim of
wrongful or retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy for
whistleblowers; however, once again, external whistleblowers often fare
better than internal whistleblowers in such claims.48 In addition to concerns
about overburdening employers by creating too many exceptions to the
employment at-will rule, courts sometimes rely on the somewhat specious
argument that there is no public interest at stake in the case of an employee
who is discharged for having reported illegal or unethical conduct to the
employer rather than a public agency.49
Closer to home, if a lawyer who is contemplating making a report of
another lawyer‘s unethical conduct happens to look at cases involving
whistleblowing lawyers, the lawyer may be even less inclined to make the
report. In numerous instances, lawyers have been fired after having
reported the misconduct of another lawyer to disciplinary authorities,
having raised the possibility of doing so, or having raised concerns over
misconduct internally within a firm.50 There are a good number of such
cases, and the results are even more unpredictable than in cases of nonlawyer whistleblowers.51 Although some courts have recognized these
claims, whistleblowing lawyers who pursue legal action after being
discharged may nonetheless face potentially significant obstacles. For
instance, some attorneys have had success on a contract theory, arguing that
adherence to the rules of professional conduct is an implied term of any
lawyer‘s employment and that discharging an attorney for attempting to

47. Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 14–15).
48. Id. (manuscript at 13).
49. Id. (manuscript at 14).
50. See generally Long, Retaliatory Discharge, supra note 8, at 1049–50 (categorizing these
types of cases).
51. See id. at 1049–62 (summarizing the results of such cases); see also Anthony E. Davis,
Professional Responsibility, N.Y.L.J., May 1, 2006 (describing associate‘s retaliation claim based
upon his refusal to engage in unethical conduct); Mary Pat Gallagher, Difrancesco Former
Partner Ratchets Up Suit Against Firm, N.J.L.J., Apr. 2, 2008 (describing whistleblower
retaliation suit brought by former nonequity firm partner).
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comply with the duty to report misconduct constitutes a breach.52 Although
potentially useful for some plaintiffs, this approach is of somewhat limited
value because it only applies when the reporting attorney is complying with
an ethical duty to report misconduct. An attorney who merely ―does the
right thing‖ absent any express duty would be unprotected from retaliation
as a contractual matter.53 As discussed in greater detail below, however,
there is arguably no ethical duty to raise concerns about or make a more
formal report of misconduct internally within a firm. Thus, an attorney
who is contemplating making an internal report of ethical misconduct is
unlikely to find much solace in the contractual approach.54
In the tort context, some courts have relied on the special
confidentiality rules and other ethical obligations facing lawyers in refusing
outright to recognize the retaliatory discharge claim of a whistleblowing
lawyer or placing limitations on such claims.55 As may be the case in a
contract claim, a lawyer‘s retaliatory discharge claim might be barred
because of the absence of an affirmative ethical duty to make an internal
report of wrongdoing.56 In addition, an internal whistleblowing lawyer may
confront a jurisdiction‘s refusal to recognize internal whistleblower claims
more generally.57
Even when a jurisdiction has a whistleblower statute, the
whistleblowing attorney may be left without protection for other reasons.
In Snow v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A.,58 for
example, an associate was discharged after informing state authorities that a

52. See, e.g., Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 109 (N.Y. 1992) (finding implied obligations
under the Code of Professional Responsibility in the contractual relationship between lawyers).
53. See Long, Retaliatory Discharge, supra note 8, at 1077–78 (noting that under the
employment-at-will doctrine, an employer is free to discharge an employee at any time and for
any reason).
54. It should be noted that where the attorney‘s report carries with it some express or implied
threat to make a formal external report to disciplinary authorities, the attorney‘s contract claim
may be more likely to succeed. See Wieder, 609 N.E.2d at 106 (permitting such a claim where
attorney insisted that the law firm report the misconduct of another attorney to disciplinary
authorities).
55. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 503–04 (Cal. 1994)
(stating that in-house counsel‘s retaliatory discharge claim must be dismissed if satisfying the
elements of the claim requires breaching the attorney-client privilege); Jacobson v. Knepper &
Moga, P.C., 706 N.E.2d 491, 493–94 (Ill. 1998) (holding that law firm attorney‘s obligation to
follow the Rules of Professional Conduct cannot ―be the foundation for a claim of retaliatory
discharge‖); Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 108 (Ill. 1991) (refusing to extend the tort of
retaliatory discharge to cover in-house counsel because of the attorney-client privilege).
56. See Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 715 A.2d 873, 884 (D.C. 1998)
(barring such a claim because the attorney ―failed to demonstrate the existence of a legal
obligation to report to her superiors the improper conduct which she claims to have observed‖).
57. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
58. 896 So. 2d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
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partner had diverted funds from his former law firm, allegedly in violation
of the jurisdiction‘s rules of professional conduct.59 The Florida appellate
court held that the associate had no claim under the state‘s whistleblower
statute because that statute only protected an individual who had reported a
violation of a ―law, rule, or regulation‖ to a government agency; according
to the court, Florida‘s Rules Regulating the Florida Bar did not qualify,
despite their designation as ―rules.‖60
In short, bringing misconduct to light carries with it the potential for
retaliation. In contrast, the choice to remain silent in the face of unethical
behavior carries relatively few risks for an attorney. An attorney will often
have no express duty to make an internal report of misconduct.61 And
attorneys are rarely disciplined for their failure to report another lawyer‘s
misconduct externally pursuant to Rule 8.3.62 For many attorneys, the
choice between reporting and keeping silent is, as a practical matter, quite
simple.
The general reluctance of lawyers to raise concerns about another
lawyer‘s misconduct has potentially serious consequences, however.
Because of the nature of their jobs, attorneys are in the best position to
observe and recognize unethical behavior on the part of other attorneys.63
As such, they are in perhaps the best position to protect current and future
clients from unethical behavior. If lawyers—either out of fear of being
perceived as ―snitches‖ or out of fear of being fired—are reluctant to notify
others who are in position to address misconduct, the public‘s interest in an
ethical legal profession is jeopardized.
III. RULE 5.1 AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE INTERNAL WHISTLEBLOWER
SCENARIO
The Model Rules recognize the importance of law firms developing
ethical infrastructures. In various ways, the Model Rules require law firm
partners and those with managerial authority to try to ensure that attorneys
within the firm are practicing in an ethical manner. However, there are
several gaps in the current structure that limit the effectiveness of the Model
Rules in dealing with the difficult problem of the attorney who must decide
whether to make a report of ethical wrongdoing by another attorney.

59. Id. at 789–90.
60. Id. at 791.
61. See infra notes 90–96 and accompanying text.
62. See Perlman, supra note 31, at 475 (explaining that Rule 8.3 is ―rarely enforced‖).
63. Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Attorney’s Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A
Roadmap for Reform, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 265 & n.21 (2003).
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A. Rule 5.1 and Ethical Infrastructures

Model Rule 5.1 describes the supervisory duties of law firm partners
and other superiors. The rule establishes three separate, but inter-related,
standards concerning an attorney‘s responsibility for the ethical practices of
other attorneys within the firm. Under Rule 5.1(a), a partner or an
individual attorney with managerial authority in a law firm has a duty to
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm develops internal policies
and procedures designed to promote compliance with the ethical rules.64
Rule 5.1(b) is similar in scope, but speaks directly to the individual
relationship between a supervising attorney and a subordinate attorney. The
rule imposes a duty on the supervising attorney to ―make reasonable efforts
to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional
Conduct.‖65 Finally, Rule 5.1(c) describes the situations in which a lawyer
may be held responsible for the ethical transgressions of another lawyer.66
Although each part of Rule 5.1 addresses the supervisory
responsibilities of attorneys within a firm, Rule 5.1(a) focuses most directly
on forcing firms to develop ―ethical infrastructures‖ that will encourage
ethical practices within the firm.67 Rule 5.1(a) provides,
A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together
with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in
a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm
64. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2008); id. R. 5.1 cmt. 3.
65. Id. R. 5.1(b).
66. Id. R. 5.1(c). Specifically, Rule 5.1(c) provides as follows:
A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct
involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in
which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other
lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or
mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.
Id. Under Rule 5.1(c), a lawyer is responsible for another lawyer‘s violation of an ethical rule if,
among other situations, the lawyer ―knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be
avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.‖ Id. Because the Model Rules
define the terms ―knows‖ or ―knowledge‖ in terms of actual knowledge, id. R. 1.0(f), Rule 5.1(c)
would seem to excuse a law firm attorney with managerial authority who did not ―know‖ of a
subordinate attorney‘s misconduct due to the law firm‘s failure to have in place any policy or
procedure designed to detect such misconduct. An ABA Formal Ethics Opinion, however, takes
the position that an attorney who lacks such knowledge due to the attorney‘s violation of Rule
5.1(a)‘s duty to supervise may nonetheless face discipline for the other attorney‘s misconduct.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 03-429, at 3 (2003); see also Arthur
J. Lachman, What You Should Know Can Hurt You: Management And Supervisory Responsibility
for the Misconduct of Others Under Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3, 18 PROF. LAW. 1, 2 (2007)
(analyzing the ABA opinion).
67. Schneyer, supra note 4, at 17.
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has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all
lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional
Conduct.68
As an obvious example, a law firm should have some procedures in place to
detect prohibited conflicts of interest.69 However, Rule 5.1(a) also plainly
covers the spectrum of potential ethical violations, including competency
and handling of client funds.70
Importantly, the scope of a partner‘s duty under Rule 5.1(a) does not
depend on whether another attorney in the firm has actually committed an
ethical violation.71 Nor does it matter that a partner lacked direct
supervisory authority over an attorney who committed an ethical violation
or lacked knowledge of the violation.72 Indeed, as one court has observed,
a partner‘s lack of knowledge might actually help establish a violation of
the rule.73 What matters for purposes of Rule 5.1(a), according to the
comments, is whether a partner has made ―reasonable efforts to establish
internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance
that all lawyers in the firm will conform to the Rules of Professional
Conduct.‖74
Despite imposing a duty to make ―reasonable efforts‖ to encourage
firm-wide compliance procedures, Rule 5.1(a) stops short of defining that
duty with any degree of specificity. The comments explain that, as is the
case with tort law‘s ―reasonable person‖ standard, what constitutes a
reasonable effort to ensure compliance varies with the structure and nature
of the firm‘s practice.75 ―In a small firm of experienced lawyers,‖ the
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a).
69. See id. R. 1.7 cmt. 3 (―To determine whether a conflict of interest exists, a lawyer should
adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in
both litigation and non-litigation matters the persons and issues involved.‖).
70. Id. R. 5.1 cmt. 2; see Irwin D. Miller, Preventing Misconduct by Promoting the Ethics of
Attorneys’ Supervisory Duties, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 259, 268 (1994) (discussing the way that
Rule 5.1 requires supervision of attorneys‘ duty of competency).
71. See Miller, supra note 70, at 279 (―[F]ailure to make reasonable preventative efforts
theoretically subjects every partner to professional discipline . . . regardless of any misconduct at
all.‖). The comments clarify that the duty under Rule 5.1(a) applies not just to traditional law firm
partners, but to others with similar managerial authority in other settings, such as the law
department of a government agency. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 5.1 cmt. 1; see also
In re Myers, 584 S.E.2d 357, 362 (S.C. 2003) (per curiam) (concluding that the rule applies to
attorneys in government agencies).
72. In re Anonymous Member of the S.C. Bar, 552 S.E.2d 10, 14–15 (S.C. 2001); see Miller,
supra note 70, at 279 (acknowledging that attorneys can violate the rule ―regardless of the
partner‘s remoteness from the violating attorney‖ or ―the partner‘s knowledge or suspicion of any
misconduct‖).
73. In re Anonymous Member, 552 S.E.2d at 15.
74. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 5.1 cmt. 2.
75. Id. cmt. 3.
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comments explain, ―informal supervision and periodic review of
compliance with the required systems ordinarily will suffice.‖76 In larger
firms or firms with sophisticated practices, ―more elaborate measures may
be necessary.‖77 Such measures might include establishing ―a procedure
whereby junior lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical problems
directly to a designated senior partner or special committee.‖78
Commentators have suggested other possible compliance measures that
might help satisfy this duty, including the establishment of a mentoring
program or a legal or ethics counsel.79 The limited case law on the subject
suggests that the failure to have some type of review mechanism in place by
which a supervisor may review an associate‘s work may also give rise to a
violation of Rule 5.1(a).80
B. The Gap in Coverage
Despite the broad scope of Rule 5.1(a), there are numerous factors that
work to limit its overall effectiveness in encouraging firms to develop a
culture of ethical practice. Most obvious is the fact that the rule‘s
―reasonable efforts‖ standard does not require law firm partners to establish
any particular measures that firm lawyers should follow to guide them in
their day-to-day practice or in the case of questionable ethical conduct.
Other factors also work to create something of a gap in the coverage of the
Model Rules when it comes to lawyers who suspect that another attorney is
engaged in unethical conduct.
1. The Absence of Ethical Rules Regarding Internal Reporting of
Misconduct
The Model Rules do not specifically require a law firm to establish a
procedure for handling internal reports of ethical misconduct. Nor, except
in limited circumstances, do the Model Rules speak directly to the internal
handling of an ethical dilemma within a law firm. Rule 8.3(a) imposes an
affirmative obligation on the part of a lawyer who knows of another
lawyer‘s serious misconduct to make an external report of the unethical
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Lachman, supra note 66, at 6. The regulations accompanying the SarbanesOxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.), contain a similar requirement. Supervisory
attorneys must make ―reasonable efforts‖ to ensure that subordinate attorneys conform to the
Sarbanes-Oxley regulations. 17 C.F.R. § 205.4(b) (2008). Like the Model Rules, the regulations
do not elaborate on what is meant by the term ―reasonable efforts.‖
80. See, e.g., In re Cohen, 847 A.2d 1162, 1166 (D.C. 2004) (finding a law firm‘s lack of an
attorney review mechanism ―troubling‖).
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conduct to appropriate disciplinary authorities.81 While an attorney who
knows that another attorney has engaged in misconduct ―that raises a
substantial question as to that lawyer‘s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as
a lawyer in other respects‖ must report out to disciplinary authorities,82
nothing in the Model Rules imposes a duty on the part of such an attorney
to first notify others within the attorney‘s law firm, despite the fact that it
might obviously be in the interests of all parties concerned.83
The closest the Model Rules come to addressing such situations
directly is Rule 5.2, which describes the duties of subordinate attorneys.
Under Rule 5.2, a subordinate attorney remains responsible for the
attorney‘s own ethical violation, despite the fact that the subordinate
attorney was acting at the direction of a supervising attorney. 84 The
subordinate attorney may avoid discipline, however, when she acts in
accordance with a supervising attorney‘s ―reasonable resolution of an
arguable question of professional duty.‖85 The comments explain that
where an ethical question is ―reasonably arguable,‖ the subordinate attorney
―may be guided‖ by the supervising attorney‘s reasonable resolution of the
matter.86 Therefore, one might plausibly argue that because the rule
contemplates a dialogue between the subordinate and supervising attorneys,
the rule presupposes a duty on the part of a subordinate to raise any
concerns about the propriety of an action with her supervisors within the
firm.
To date, however, no court that has considered such an argument has
accepted the idea that Rule 5.2 imposes any type of affirmative duty on the
part of a subordinate attorney to report questionable ethical conduct
internally. In Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom,87 the D.C.
Court of Appeals rejected an associate‘s argument that implicit in Rules 5.1
and 5.2 was an obligation to report to her superiors within a law firm the
improper conduct of other attorneys she claimed to have observed.88
Accordingly, the court rejected her claim of wrongful discharge based on
the theory that she had been retaliated against for having reported such

81. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a).
82. Id.
83. At least one bar association ethics opinion has suggested that such a duty should be
imposed. See Ass‘n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Op. 82-79 (1982) (stating that it is desirable
that an associate raise a matter of possible professional misconduct involving a partner within the
firm before reporting to disciplinary authorities).
84. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 5.2(a).
85. Id. R. 5.2(b) (emphasis added).
86. Id. R. 5.2 cmt. 2.
87. 715 A.2d 873 (D.C. 1998).
88. Id. at 884.
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conduct internally.89 The court opined that not only do the rules not
expressly impose a duty upon a subordinate attorney to report misconduct
to superiors within the firm, ―on their face, the two Rules appear to have
nothing to do with any such claimed obligation.‖90
In other situations, a firm attorney may have a duty to notify others
within the firm about possible misconduct. Those situations, however, are
fairly limited. Under Rule 5.1(c)(2), for example, a partner or supervising
attorney is responsible for the misconduct of another attorney if the partner
or supervising attorney knew of the misconduct but failed to take
reasonable remedial action in time to avoid or mitigate the consequences.91
Logically, reasonable remedial action might include notifying others within
the firm of the misconduct so that appropriate action can be taken.92 On its
face, however, the rule applies only to partners (or those with comparable
managerial authority) and attorneys with direct supervisory authority, not
more junior attorneys. One could also argue that a lawyer‘s duty of
competence would compel the lawyer to notify someone of another
lawyer‘s misconduct that might adversely affect a client.93 And in light of
confidentiality concerns, the most likely someone in such a case would be
another attorney in the same law firm. However, even if a successful
argument could be made that the duty of competence requires internal
reporting of ethical misconduct, the scope of such a duty would be limited.
Because the duty of competence is one owed to a lawyer‘s client, a lawyer
might only have a duty to make an internal report when the lawyer was
involved in the representation of the adversely affected firm client.94 In
other instances, it might be consistent with a lawyer‘s duty of loyalty to the
law firm as an employee to notify the firm of misconduct that might
negatively impact the firm.95 But in terms of express disciplinary rules, the

89. Id. at 883–84.
90. Id. at 884.
91. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 5.1(c)(2).
92. See Long, Retaliatory Discharge, supra note 8, at 1051–52 (discussing internal
whistleblowing).
93. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (―A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client.‖); see also id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (―A lawyer should . . . take whatever lawful
and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client‘s cause or endeavor.‖).
94. See id. R. 1.1 (―A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.‖ (emphasis
added)).
95. See Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1263, 1265 (Mass. 1989) (explaining that
law firm partners owe each other fiduciary duties and that ―‗[e]mployees occupying a position of
trust and confidence owe a duty of loyalty to their employer and must protect the interests of their
employer‘‖ (alteration in original) (quoting Chelsea Indus., Inc. v. Gaffney, 449 N.E.2d 320, 326
(Mass. 1983))); Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 8) (―[A] loyal employee must view the good
of the organization as a whole and behave according to what is best for the future of the
corporation.‖).
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Model Rules are generally silent on the specific issue of internal reporting
of misconduct.96
2. The Absence of Ethical Rules Prohibiting Retaliation
The absence of any explicit duty on the part of a law firm or its
partners to establish an internal reporting mechanism or on the part of
subordinate attorneys to make an internal report of questionable ethical
conduct is noteworthy because no other ethical rule specifically prevents
retaliation when an associate makes such an internal report.97 Moreover, no
ethical rule explicitly prohibits a lawyer or law firm from retaliating against
an attorney who makes an external report of misconduct to disciplinary
authorities pursuant to Rule 8.3.98 As the case law attests, the internal
whistleblower may face retaliation from the employing law firm.99 Yet, no
Model Rule prohibits such action expressly.100 As discussed in greater
detail later, interference with or hindrance of the disciplinary process may

96. Rule 1.13 sometimes requires a lawyer who represents a corporate client to report
unlawful conduct on the part of a person associated with the organization up the corporate ladder.
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b). However, the rule only requires a lawyer to
report such misconduct to the client, not to the lawyer‘s employer.
97. See infra Part IV.A.1 and accompanying text.
98. See infra Part IV.A.1 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. In some cases, the attorney is part of a
traditional law firm. See, e.g., Kelly v. Hunton & Williams, No. 97-CV-5631, 1999 WL 408416,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y June 17, 1999) (involving a law firm associate who was forced to resign after
raising questions to firm management about partner‘s supposed overbilling); Jacobson v. Knepper
& Moga, P.C., 706 N.E.2d 491, 492 (Ill. 1998) (reviewing a case in which a law firm associate
who was fired for reporting the firm‘s illegal practices to a principal partner of the firm); Bohatch
v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. 1998) (involving a law firm partner who was
discharged after raising concerns about billing practices to the firm‘s managing partner). In
others, the attorney is employed by a corporation. See, e.g., Heckman v. Zurich Holding Co. of
Am., 242 F.R.D. 606, 608 (D. Kan. 2007); Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court of San
Bernardino County, 876 P.2d 487, 490 (Cal. 1994); O‘Brien v. Stolt-Nielson Transp. Group, Ltd.,
838 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003); Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 652 A.2d 578,
581 (Del. Ch. 1994); GTE Products Corp. v. Stewart, 653 N.E.2d 161, 163 (Mass. 1995);
Nordling v. N. States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 499–500 (Minn. 1991); Considine v. Compass
Group USA, Inc., 551 S.E.2d 179, 180–81 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001); Parker v. M&T Chems., Inc.,
566 A.2d 215, 217–18 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); McGonagle v. Union Fidelity Corp., 556
A.2d 878, 879–80 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); see also Long, Retaliatory Discharge, supra note 8, at
1050 n.40 (noting and summarizing cases). Regardless of whether a lawyer works for a traditional
law firm or the legal department of a corporation, the Model Rules treat the lawyer as working for
a ―firm.‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.0(c).
100. Rule 1.13(e) addresses the issue of retaliatory discharge in a limited sense. Under the
rule, one who ―reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer‘s‖
decision to report client misconduct up the ladder of the client’s corporate structure should inform
―the organization‘s highest authority‖ about the lawyer‘s discharge. Id. R. 1.13(e). The rule does
not, however, provide any protection from retaliation in the first place. Moreover, in the case of a
law firm attorney, the rule does not prohibit the law firm from retaliating against the reporting
attorney.
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amount to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.101 But it
does not appear that any court has yet extended these principles to the
situation in which an attorney is threatened or fired after having, internally,
raised the possibility of making a formal disciplinary complaint about
another attorney.102
3. The Other Weaknesses of Rule 5.1
The absence of ethical rules requiring internal reporting of suspected
misconduct or prohibiting retaliation against internal or external
whistleblowers is significant because of the added strain it places on Rule
5.1. The gaps in the rules in this respect create a concomitant need for law
firm partners to have effective measures in place that attorneys can utilize in
the event of an ethical dilemma. Unfortunately, as currently enforced, Rule
5.1 does not appear to be fully up to the task.
Depending upon the size of the firm or the stature of the individual
partner within the firm, the ability of an individual partner to effectuate
change may be quite limited as a practical matter. Law firms continue to
rely on multi-tiered partnership structures in which non-equity partners
sometimes lack management and decision-making authority.103
Accordingly, some partners have little practical ability to influence a firm‘s
creation of an ethical infrastructure. In addition, the further removed an
individual partner is from another lawyer‘s misconduct, the greater the
likelihood that disciplinary authorities will be reluctant to charge the partner
with failing to make efforts to supervise the other attorney pursuant to Rule
5.1(b).104 And because Rule 5.1, as written, does not impose vicarious

101. See infra notes 166–175 and accompanying text.
102. Some courts have treated an employer‘s decision to fire the internal whistleblowing
attorney before the attorney has a chance to file a formal disciplinary complaint as a form of
anticipatory retaliation and recognized a wrongful discharge cause of action. See Matzkin v.
Delaney, Zemetis, Donahue, Durham & Noonan, P.C., No. CV044000288S, 2005 WL 2009277,
at *1, *4–*5 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 19, 2005) (upholding the attorney‘s cause of action for
wrongful discharge based on the law firm‘s termination of employment after learning of the
attorney‘s intent to report misconduct); Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 106, 110 (N.Y. 1992)
(same); see generally Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third
Parties and the Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 983–84 (2007)
[hereinafter Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend] (discussing the theory of anticipatory retaliation).
103. See William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single-Tier Versus Two-Tier
Partnerships in the Am Law 200, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1691, 1694 (2006) (detailing the rise of multitiered partnership structures); Robert W. Hillman, Law, Culture, and the Lore of Partnership: Of
Entrepreneurs, Accountability, and the Evolving Status of Partners, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
793, 821 (2005) (describing the multi-tiered structure of a law firm in which non-equity partners
―did not participate in firm governance, apparently had no management authority, and presumably
lacked the means or authority for monitoring the activities of equity partners‖).
104. See Miller, supra note 70, at 292–93 (speculating as to reluctance of disciplinary officials
to impose sanctions for such ―‗innocent‘ acts of omission‖).
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responsibility upon partners for the ethical violations of other attorneys,105
partners may have less incentive to take an active role in matters having no
direct bearing on their situation.
In addition to these shortcomings, the absence of disciplinary opinions
involving Rule 5.1 suggests that the rule is under-enforced. There are
relatively few disciplinary cases involving violations of Rule 5.1.106 The
typical case in which Rule 5.1 is implicated involves what Professor Irwin
D. Miller described as situations involving ―blatant lack of supervisory
efforts,‖107 in which a law firm‘s partners have made virtually no attempts
to ensure that firm attorneys are practicing in an ethical manner.108 In re
Yacavino,109 for example, involved an associate who was suspended from
the practice of law for forging a court order to conceal his negligent
handling of an adoption.110 In keeping with Rule 5.2, the fact that the
associate had, in the court‘s words, been ―left virtually alone and
unsupervised‖ in a law firm of twenty attorneys was no excuse for the
associate‘s misconduct.111 While disciplining the attorney, the court also
referenced the failure of the partners to live up to their duties as partners
under Rule 5.1, and put law firms and their partners on notice that ―this
attitude of leaving new lawyers to ‗sink or swim‘ will not be tolerated.‖112
105. In re Anonymous Member of S.C. Bar, 552 S.E.2d 10, 12 (S.C. 2001) (per curiam).
106. See Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy, supra note 7, at 126 (describing Rule 5.1(a) as a
―disciplinary ‗dead letter‘‖ due to its lack of enforcement); Epstein, supra note 18, at 1015
(describing the ―dearth of bar opinions or cases‖ on the subject of ―what constitutes ‗reasonable
efforts‘ by partners to ensure‖ compliance with the Model Rules); Miller, supra note 70, at 285
(referring to the lack of disciplinary cases). For example, according to the Office of the General
Counsel of the State Bar of Alabama, from September 1992 to December 2006, there were only
thirteen violations of Rule 5.1. Alabama State Bar, Petition to Amend the Alabama Rules of
Professional
Conduct
app.
at
13-13,
http://www.alabar.org/ogc/PDF/Petition_A_filed_Supreme_Court%20Oct12_2007.pdf
(last
visited May 19, 2009). In contrast, there were 636 violations of the rule relating to neglect of a
client matter and 518 violations of the rule relating to communication with a client. Id.
107. Miller, supra note 70, at 285–86.
108. See, e.g., In re Cohen, 847 A.2d 1162, 1166 (D.C. 2004) (involving a law firm in which
―there was no system in place to impart rudimentary ethics training to lawyers in the firm,
particularly the less experienced ones‖ and the ―lack of a review mechanism which allowed an
associate's work to be reviewed and guided by a supervisory attorney‖); In re Weston, 442 N.E.2d
236, 239 (Ill. 1982) (involving an attorney who assigned a matter to an associate but was unable to
supervise the associate due to ―his duties and extensive travels as president of a national
association‖ over a period of a few years); K,. Bar Ass‘n v. Weinberg, 198 S.W.3d 595, 597 (Ky.
2006) (involving an attorney who delegated a case to another attorney, who allowed the statute of
limitations to run and who then delegated the case to a subordinate attorney); In re Barbare, 602
S.E.2d 382, 383 (S.C. 2004) (involving a partner in a two-person law firm whose inadequate
accounting system allowed for several instances of criminal fraud).
109. 494 A.2d 801 (N.J. 1985) (per curiam).
110. Id. at 802, 804.
111. Id. at 802–03.
112. Id. at 803.
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One likely reason for the lack of disciplinary decisions involving Rule
5.1 is that firm lawyers are the most likely source of complaints. Yet, firm
lawyers (or even former lawyers) are, for the reasons discussed
previously,113 unlikely to ever file a complaint about the lack of supervision
or ethical infrastructures within a firm. As an example, over three years,
one state disciplinary agency reported a total of twenty-six complaints of
failure to supervise non-lawyers in violation of Rule 5.3 (the majority of
which presumably came from the non-lawyers in question), but exactly zero
complaints regarding the failure to supervise subordinate lawyers under
Rule 5.1(b).114 Yet, the opportunity for enforcement still exists. As
Professor Miller has noted, ―[a]rguably, every case of professional
discipline, other than cases against sole practitioners, raises the question of
whether reasonable (preventive) measures (Rule 5.1(a)) were in effect and
whether reasonable (preventive) efforts (Rule 5.1(b)) were made.‖115 Thus,
virtually every case presents the chance to publicize and to promote the
goals underlying Rule 5.1.
The lack of decisional law has meant that the scope of a partner‘s
duties under Rule 5.1 (and 5.1(a) in particular) remains largely undefined.
It seems clear that in virtually all situations, regardless of firm size or
practice complexity, the failure to utilize a mechanism to review the work
of at least junior attorneys should constitute a violation of Rule 5.1(a).116
But how much further must a firm go in order to comply? In one instance,
the D.C. Court of Appeals, although stopping short of imposing an
affirmative duty under Rule 5.1(a), criticized a relatively small firm (twelve
attorneys) for its failure to have a ―system in place to impart rudimentary
ethics training to lawyers in the firm, particularly the less experienced
ones.‖117 Although Rule 5.1(a)‘s ―reasonable efforts‖ standard makes it
difficult to establish bright-line rules, is this the type of minimal compliance
effort that virtually any firm should be expected to undertake? Without
more decisions involving Rule 5.1, the contours of the rule remain largely
undefined.

113. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text (discussing conformity within law firms).
114. See Annual Report of the Lawyer Disciplinary Board, W. VA. LAW., Mar./Apr. 2007, at
30 (reporting eight complaints for failure to supervise non-lawyers filed in 2006); Lawyer
Disciplinary Board Report, W. VA. LAW., May/June 2006, at 34 (reporting nine complaints for
failure to supervise non-lawyers filed in 2005); Report to the Board of Governors from Lawyer
Disciplinary Board, W. VA. LAW., Jan./Feb. 2005, at 32–33 (reporting nine complaints for failure
to supervise non-lawyers filed in 2002).
115. Miller, supra note 70, at 285.
116. See generally In re Cohen, 847 A.2d 1162, 1163, 1166–67 (D.C. 2004) (finding a Rule
5.1(c) violation for similar inaction in a firm of twelve attorneys).
117. Id. at 1163, 1166.
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C. What Law Firms Do in Practice
1. Existing Studies of Law Firm Compliance Procedures
There have been a number of studies in the past decade touching on
the question of how law firms develop and maintain ethical infrastructures.
In addition to inquiring about law firm billing practices, Professor Fortney‘s
2000 study of law firm associates explored the extent to which law firms
had systems or policies ―for dealing with ethical concerns of attorneys‖ in
place.118 Her results suggest that ethical infrastructures are not as robust
and widely used in the law firm setting as one might expect in light of the
obligations that Rule 5.1 imposes. Only 54% of respondents replied that
their firms did have such measures in place, with 22% reporting the absence
of such measures and 24% indicating that they did not know if any kind of
system or policy was in place.119 Large firms were more likely to have
formal systems—such as the existence of an ethics committee or scheduled
ethics training—in place than were small and mid-sized firms.120
One frequently discussed option for resolving the myriad professional
responsibility issues that can arise in a law firm is the use of an in-house
ethics advisor.121 The structure and responsibilities of such positions may
vary widely,122 but it is clear that the position of an in-house ethics expert is
now fairly common at larger law firms. A 2002 study of large law firms by
Professors Elizabeth Chambliss and David B. Wilkins revealed that each of
the thirty-two responding firms had at least one partner with ―special
responsibility for promoting ethics and/or regulatory compliance.‖123
According to a 2004 survey conducted by consulting group Altman Weil,
nearly two-thirds of responding law firms in the AmLaw 200 had a
designated general counsel, and in close to 90% of those firms, general
counsel advised the firm on professional responsibility issues.124
118. Fortney, supra note 1, at 254.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 255 tbl.2, 256 (breaking down percentage of firms with formal ethics systems
based on firm size).
121. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 18, at 1012–13 (advocating that firms utilize in-house ethics
specialists or committees).
122. According to a study by Professors Elizabeth Chambliss and David B. Wilkins, for
example, in many firms the individual held a formal position with a designated title and specific
assigned duties. Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors,
General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 559,
565 (2002) [hereinafter Chambliss & Wilkins, The Emerging Role]. In others, the responsibilities
and title of the position (for example, ―our ethics guy‖) are less formal in nature. Id.
123. Id. The study‘s sample consisted of law firms ranging from 75 to over 1,000 attorneys.
Id. at 561.
124. WARD BOWER, ALTMAN WEIL, INC., REPORT TO LEGAL MANAGEMENT: MAJOR LAW
FIRMS EMBRACE GENERAL COUNSEL CONCEPT 1 & fig.1, 10 fig.10 (2004), available at
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The extent to which the typical law firm associate has access to these
kinds of designated ethics experts, however, is questionable. According to
the Altman Weil survey, although high-ranking law firm partners typically
had access to a firm‘s general counsel, less than half of the responding
firms reported that associates were authorized to access these
individuals.125 And in small to mid-sized firms—where the vast majority
of lawyers in private practice are employed—there are few designated
ethics experts. In Professor Fortney‘s survey, only 15% of small-firm
respondents indicated that they had a designated ethics expert or similar
position, as compared to 35% of mid-sized-firm respondents.126
2. Results of the 2008 Study
My primary goals in conducting a survey regarding law firm ethical
infrastructures were to obtain more data regarding the practices of smaller
law firms and, more specifically, the extent to which law firms have in
place measures for the internal resolution of ethical concerns. Regarding
the first goal, most of the empirical research to date has focused on the
practices of larger law firms. For example, Professors Chambliss and
Wilkins‘ research into law firm compliance procedures was limited to law
firms with a minimum of seventy-five attorneys.127 Yet, according to a
2000 American Bar Foundation survey, only 1.5% of large firms in the
United States consist of more than fifty attorneys.128 Likewise, Professor
Fortney‘s survey was limited to associates in law firms with more than ten
attorneys.129 Yet, according to the American Bar Foundation survey,
nearly 90% of the law firms in the United States consist of ten or fewer
lawyers.130 Thus, despite the value of the previous surveys, there is a need
for more data concerning the practices of smaller law firms. Of the
respondents to my survey, 75% were from firms consisting of ten or fewer
attorneys.131

http://www.altmanweil.com/dir_docs/resource/fa00e91f-9955-4dce-b6f4d088b9fe2f0b_document.pdf [hereinafter ALTMAN WEIL SURVEY]. Professor Fortney‘s survey
found that 56% of large firms that responded employed a designated ethics counsel. Fortney,
supra note 1, at 255 tbl.2.
125. ALTMAN WEIL SURVEY, supra note 124, at 10 fig.9.
126. Fortney, supra note 1, at 255 tbl.2.
127. See Chambliss & Wilkins, The Emerging Role, supra note 122, at 561.
128. CARSON, supra note 15, at 30.
129. Fortney, supra note 1, at 246 n.35.
130. CARSON, supra note 15, at 30. By comparison, 87.3% of Tennessee law firms consist of
ten or fewer attorneys, according to the American Bar Foundation Survey. Id. at 204.
131. Respondents were asked to indicate the size of their law firms. The results were as
follows: 1–2 attorneys: 28 (17.9%); 3–10 attorneys: 89 (57.1%); 11–24 attorneys: 21 (13.5%);
25–100 attorneys: 11 (7.1%); over 100 attorneys: 7 (4.5%).
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Nearly all of the respondents indicated that their firms had some type
of policy or procedure in place to help firm attorneys resolve questions or
concerns about their own ethical obligations in a matter.132 The most
frequently cited specific practices were the traditional up-the-chain-ofcommand approach of referral to the attorney‘s direct supervisor, managing
partner, or practice area leader.133 Respondents—particularly from smaller
firms—also frequently cited more informal practices, such as consultation
with other firm attorneys, colleagues in other firms, or representatives from
the state disciplinary authority.134
Fewer respondents indicated that their firms used a designated ethics
counsel (12%), general counsel with responsibility for ethics issues (5%), or
ethics committee (5%) to help attorneys resolve their ethical dilemmas.
Indeed, when asked specifically whether their firm had a designated ethics
counsel, general counsel who handles ethics matters, ethics committee, or
similar position, only 21% of respondents answered in the affirmative.
Here, there was a clear distinction between the practices of larger and
smaller firms. Not surprisingly, larger firms were more likely to report the
existence of designated individuals within the firm charged with
responsibility for handling ethics matters than were smaller firms. Of the
respondents from firms with twenty-five or more attorneys, nearly 67%
reported the existence of such individuals. Of the respondents from firms
with ten or fewer attorneys, only 15% reported the existence of such
individuals.

132. Only 4% of respondents—all of them from firms with fewer than ten attorneys—indicated
that their firms had no measures in place to handle such matters.
133. Fifty-seven percent of respondents indicated that their firms used the practice of referral
to a managing partner or practice area leader. Thirty-three percent reported the use of referral to a
lawyer‘s direct supervisor. Respondents were free to choose from a list of possible policies or
procedures. Specifically, respondents were asked the following question:
If an attorney in your firm has a question or concern about his or her ethical obligations
in a matter, what policies or procedures exist within the firm to help the attorney
resolve the issue?
Referral to designated ethics counsel
Referral to general counsel
Referral to ethics committee
Referral to ombudsman
Referral to managing partner or practice area leader
Referral to attorney's direct supervisor(s)
Referral to outside counsel
Other (please explain)
None
134. Forty percent of respondents chose the ―Other‖ option from the list of options above. See
supra note 133. When asked to explain, these informal practices were the most common
explanations.
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The survey yielded similar data with respect to policies or procedures
regarding internal reporting of suspected misconduct on the part of another
attorney. Most firms reported the existence of some type of policy or
procedure that allows an attorney with concerns about suspected
misconduct on the part of another attorney to resolve those concerns.135
Again, respondents most frequently cited some form of referral up the chain
of command as a specific existing practice in their firms. 136 However, only
15% indicated that they had a formal written policy that encouraged
attorneys to notify someone within the firm about suspected misconduct
involving another attorney. Once again, larger firms were more likely to
report the existence of such a policy than were smaller firms. Of the
responding law firms with fewer than twenty-five attorneys, only 10%
reported the existence of such a policy.137 Of the larger responding firms, a
slight majority (56%) reported that they had such a policy.138 With respect
to small firms, these results are probably not surprising. For example, a
firm consisting of two equal partners and no associates would obviously be
unlikely to have a formal internal reporting system in place. However, of
the respondents from firms with between eleven and twenty-four
attorneys—firms that are almost certainly large enough to have and
potentially benefit from formal infrastructures, including some type of
internal reporting procedure—only one out of twenty-one (4.7%) reported
the existence of such a policy. These findings appear consistent with the
retaliatory discharge cases brought by whistleblowing lawyers; in contrast
with many other whistleblower cases involving non-lawyers,139 there is
rarely, if ever, any mention of any type of internal reporting policy in
existence at the law firms that encouraged internal reporting of misconduct.
One might suspect that if a firm encouraged the reporting of suspected
misconduct that it would also offer some assurance of protection from
retaliation as a matter of course. However, this is not necessarily the case.
Although most of the respondents who indicated the existence of a policy
encouraging internal reporting also indicated that the policy provided
135. Only 10% of respondents—all of them from firms of ten or fewer attorneys—reported
that their firms lacked any such policy.
136. Fifty-four percent of respondents indicated that their firms used the practice of referral to
a managing partner or practice area leader. Twenty-six percent reported the use of referral to a
lawyer‘s direct supervisor.
137. The p-value for this question was p < .001.
138. While it seems safe to conclude that the existence of such policies are more common at
larger firms, the relatively small number of responding law firms of more than twenty-five
attorneys (eighteen total) makes it difficult to draw any conclusions about just how common the
practice is at larger firms.
139. See, e.g., Anda v. Wickes Furniture Co., 517 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting, in a
discrimination case, the employer‘s anti-harassment policy, which instructed employees to report
objectionable behavior).
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assurance of protection from retaliation, 25% of respondents indicated that
their policies did not contain any statement providing assurance of
protection from retaliation.140
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
As the law governing lawyers currently exists, Rule 5.1(a) does not
require law firms or individual partners to take any specific action with
respect to developing a firm‘s ethical infrastructures, the rule is only rarely
enforced, and there is no guarantee of protection from retaliation for
attorneys who make internal or external reports of unethical conduct. There
are any number of ways in which these shortcomings could be addressed.
For instance, a jurisdiction‘s disciplinary authority could establish a formal
operating procedure of investigating whether a firm has complied with its
obligations under Rule 5.1 every time an ethics complaint against a lawyer
in the firm is filed. However, this Article focuses primarily on rules-based
solutions to the current problem.
As this Part argues, protection from retaliation for attorneys who
report misconduct is vital to the goal of promoting an ethical legal
profession and promoting public confidence. Equally important to these
goals is the creation of formal procedures within law firms designed to
investigate and resolve concerns of possible unethical conduct. To those
ends, this Part proposes several alternatives to the current regulatory
framework regarding whistleblowing lawyers and the creation of ethical
infrastructures—beginning with the most conservative and ending with the
most far-reaching—in an effort to achieve these goals.
A. Rules-Based Approach to Prohibiting Retaliation Against
Whistleblowing Attorneys
1. The Need for Protection from Retaliation
If the legal profession wants attorneys to take seriously their external
reporting obligations under Rule 8.3 and to feel free to raise concerns
internally over suspected unethical conduct, the profession, at a minimum,
needs to afford lawyers with some protection from retaliation in such
instances. At present, the Model Rules do not speak at length to the
disciplinary process. In addition to the reporting requirement contained in
Rule 8.3(a), Rule 8.1 prohibits a lawyer from making false statements of
material fact in connection with a disciplinary proceeding, failing to
140. The survey did not yield a significant correlation between the size of the firm and the
assurance of protection from retaliation. Eight out of ten responding firms with twenty-five or
more attorneys reported that their policies provided assurances of protection, whereas ten out of
fourteen of smaller firms reported the same. The p-value here was .509.
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disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known to have arisen
in the matter, and knowingly failing to respond to a lawful demand for
information from a disciplinary authority.141 These two rules represent the
only explicit limitations on lawyers‘ conduct in connection with
disciplinary proceedings.142 No rule expressly addresses a lawyer‘s attempt
to interfere with the disciplinary process or to intimidate or retaliate against
those who participate in the process or otherwise seek to oppose conduct
that conflicts with the ethical rules. Nor do the Model Rules expressly
prohibit retaliation against lawyers who oppose unethical conduct
internally.
This failure to adopt rules specifically protecting the sanctity of the
disciplinary process stands in marked contrast to the protection afforded
those who oppose unlawful or unethical conduct in some other contexts and
those who participate in other formal processes designed to address
wrongdoing. At the federal level, statutes that seek to address a specific
problem (such as discrimination, safety, or environmental concerns)
frequently contain protection for internal as well as external
whistleblowers.143 For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (―SarbanesOxley‖ or the ―Act‖)144 contemplates that employers will establish
procedures to encourage and provide for the internal reporting of actions
that may constitute a violation of securities law. Specifically, SarbanesOxley requires publicly traded companies to establish internal procedures to
address possible violations of securities law,145 and envisions that
employees will bring their suspicions of such violations to their supervisors.
Thus, the whistleblower provision of the Act makes it unlawful to take
action against an employee when the employee provides information or
causes information to be provided to a person with supervisory authority
over the employee or when the employee otherwise assists in an
investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably
believes constitutes a violation of Sarbanes-Oxley.146 The Act also seeks to
protect the sanctity of the enforcement process itself by prohibiting adverse
action against those who ―file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in, or
141. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.1 (2008).
142. Rule 8.5 addresses choice of law issues with respect to disciplinary proceedings, but does
not impose any ethical standard with which a lawyer must comply. See generally id. R. 8.5
(setting forth disciplinary authority and choice of law provisions).
143. See Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 15) (noting the protection for internal
whistleblowers in these types of statutes); see generally Cherry, supra note 45, at app. B
(collecting federal statutes that contain whistleblower protections).
144. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
145. Id. § 105, 116 Stat. 759–64; see also infra notes 278–280 and accompanying text.
146. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C) (2006).
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otherwise assist in a proceeding filed or about to be filed.‖147 Thus,
Sarbanes-Oxley seeks to protect the act of opposing or bringing to light
internally what one reasonably believes amounts to a violation of the Act as
well as the act of participating in the enforcement process itself.148
The major federal employment discrimination statutes likewise protect
the act of internal reporting or opposition as well as more formal
participation in the external remedial process. Title VII, 149 for example,
provides protection from retaliation for an employee who opposes internally
what the employee reasonably and in good faith believes to be conduct
made unlawful by Title VII as well as for an employee who files a formal
charge of discrimination, testifies, assists, or otherwise participates in a
proceeding pursuant to Title VII.150 The Americans with Disabilities Act
(―ADA‖)151 contains a similar provision making it unlawful for an
employer ―to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in
the exercise or enjoyment of‖ rights granted by the ADA.152
In enacting these provisions, Congress recognized that some type of
protection for both internal reporting and external participation in the
statutory remedial process was essential if the goals of the relevant statutes
were to be attained. The tendency with these statutes has been to focus on
the need to preserve employee access and willingness to access the statutory
remedial processes.153 Permitting employers to intimidate and retaliate
against those who file charges concerning unlawful conduct would
147. Id. § 1514A(a)(2).
148. See Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why
Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 77–78 (2007) (noting
the potentially expansive breadth of protected activity under Sarbanes-Oxley). The regulations
accompanying the Act contain language regarding the responsibilities of supervising attorneys
relative to subordinate attorneys under their supervision that roughly tracks the language of Model
Rule 5.1. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.4(b) (2008) (stating that a supervisory attorney must ―make
reasonable efforts to ensure that a subordinate attorney . . . that he or she supervises or directs
conforms‖ to Sarbanes-Oxley‘s requirements). The same is true with respect to the duties of
subordinate attorneys and Rule 5.2. See id. § 205.5(b) (―A subordinate attorney shall comply with
[the Act] notwithstanding that the subordinate attorney acted at the direction of or under the
supervision of another person.‖).
149. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000)).
150. Id. § 704(a), 78 Stat. 257 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000)); see
Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1125 (8th Cir. 2006) (interpreting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3 as prohibiting ―opposition to practices that are not unlawful, if an employee acted based
on good faith, objectively reasonable belief that the practices were unlawful‖).
151. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 and 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (2000)).
152. Id. § 503(b), 104 Stat. 370 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2000)).
153. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (explaining that the primary
purpose of the anti-retaliation provisions in the Civil Rights Act are to maintain ―unfettered access
to statutory remedial mechanisms‖).
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undermine the goals of the relevant statute. But protecting the willingness
and ability of employees to bring their concerns about improper behavior to
superiors within an organization has its own salutary effects. By following
established channels, an employee who brings suspected wrongdoing to the
attention of others within the company provides the company with the
opportunity to correct the offending behavior before further harm is
done.154 Thus, the ability and willingness of employees to notify
appropriate individuals about the misconduct of others may obviate the
need to go outside the confines of the company as well as prevent or
mitigate future harm.
2.

Using Existing Rules to Discourage Interference with the
Disciplinary Process and Retaliation Against Whistleblowing
Attorneys

As is the case with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Title VII, and other
statutes, the legal profession should prohibit retaliation not just against
those who report misconduct externally to disciplinary authorities, but
against those who, in good faith, act reasonably in raising concerns about
misconduct within a law firm. The Model Rules have undergone extensive
revision in the last decade, prompting many states to evaluate what changes,
if any, they wish to adopt.155 Therefore, some jurisdictions may be
suffering from ethics overload and are unlikely to adopt yet another series
of substantive revisions to their rules. Even so, there are currently several
existing rules of professional conduct, which, if disciplinary authorities
were so inclined, could be used to prohibit retaliation against
whistleblowing attorneys.
a. Prohibiting Retaliation Against External Whistleblowers:
The Duty to Report, Conduct Prejudicial to the
Administration of Justice, and Interference with the
Disciplinary Process
There are several existing rules that relate indirectly to the problem of
retaliation against lawyers who make external reports of misconduct to
disciplinary authorities. One approach to the problem might be to
154. See Parker v. Bal. & Ohio Ry. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (―[B]y
extending protection to employees who oppose discriminatory practices without recourse to the
EEOC, Congress encouraged voluntary internal attempts to remedy discrimination.‖); see also
Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (stating that the creation of internal
mechanisms for addressing complaints of discrimination ―could encourage employees to report
harassing conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive‖).
155. See Lucian T. Pera, Grading ABA Leadership on Legal Ethics Leadership: State Adoption
of the Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 637, 638 &
n.1 (2005) (discussing the ABA‘s Ethics 2000 initiative and the response of state bars).
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recognize that inherent in a lawyer‘s duty under Rule 8.3(a) to make a
disciplinary complaint about misconduct that reflects adversely on another
lawyer‘s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects is
a duty on the part of the lawyer‘s employer or the subject of the disciplinary
complaint not to subvert the disciplinary process. In Iowa Supreme Court
Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Miller,156 a former in-house
lawyer made a threat to her former employer that if the employer did not
provide her with compensation for her dismissal and withdraw a
disciplinary complaint it had filed against her, she would file charges with
the Securities and Exchange Commission against the employer as well as
charges of sexual harassment and trade libel.157 The Iowa Supreme Court
held that making these threats amounted to a violation of the rule regarding
the reporting of serious misconduct to disciplinary authorities.158 In the
court‘s view, the duty to report misconduct ―implies a duty by the subject
attorney not to frustrate that process, and an attempt to interfere in the
grievance process is a basis for discipline.‖159
Another approach would focus on a lawyer‘s duty to avoid engaging in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice under Model Rule
8.4(d).160 The language of the rule is unquestionably broad and has been
the subject of vagueness criticisms.161 Although courts and disciplinary
authorities have adopted various interpretations of Rule 8.4(d),162 the
interpretation most faithful to the actual language of the rule focuses on
whether, in the words of one court, the conduct ―impedes or subverts the
process of resolving disputes; it is conduct which frustrates the fair balance
of interests or ‗justice‘ essential to litigation or other proceedings.‖163

156. 568 N.W.2d 665 (Iowa 1997).
157. Id. at 666.
158. Id. at 667.
159. Id.
160. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2008).
161. See, e.g., In re Discipline of Attorney, 815 N.E.2d 1072, 1078 (Mass. 2004) (stating that
the broad language of the rule ―presents the risk of vagueness and arbitrary application‖ (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Grievance Adm‘r v. Fried, 570 N.W.2d 262, 265 (Mich. 1997) (per
curiam) (noting that application of such a ―broad rule‖ requires caution).
162. See, e.g., Att‘y Grievance Comm‘n v. Childress, 770 A.2d 685, 694 (Md. 2001) (finding
that an attorney who had solicited sex from minors violated rule).
163. In re Friedman, 23 P.3d 620, 628 (Alaska 2001); see also People v. Jaramillo, 35 P.3d
723, 731 (Colo. 2001) (stating that the rule ―requires proof of some nexus between the conduct
charged and an adverse effect upon the administration of justice‖); Fla. Bar v. Pettie, 424 So. 2d
734, 737–38 (Fla. 1982) (noting that Florida‘s version of Rule 8.4(d), barring conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice, prohibits those activities that ―undermine[] the legitimacy of the
judicial processes‖).
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Examples include manufacturing conflicts of interest in order to force
recusal164 and lying under oath.165
Several courts have held that the rule applies not just to conduct in
connection with traditional litigation, but also to attempts to prevent others
from filing disciplinary complaints.166 In Florida Bar v. Frederick,167 the
Florida Supreme Court held that an attorney who required clients to sign a
release agreeing to not contact the Florida Bar with complaints concerning
the attorney or to withdraw any complaints they had previously filed before
he would release funds to the clients amounted to a violation of Florida‘s
version of Rule 8.4(d).168 Rejecting the attorney‘s argument that the rule
applied only to conduct in a judicial proceeding, the court stated that
―conduct that prejudices our system of justice as a whole also is
encompassed by‖ the rule.169 Similarly, in Lawyer Disciplinary Board v.
Artimez,170 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that an
attorney who negotiated a similar arrangement with a client had likewise
engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.171 After
noting that ―‗[t]he principle purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is
to safeguard the public‘s interest in the administration of justice,‘‖ the court
concluded that the attorney‘s attempt to avoid the ethical obligations and
disciplinary process that governed his actions amounted to a violation of
Rule 8.4(d).172
164. E.g., Fried, 570 N.W.2d at 267 (―A lawyer who joins a case as co-counsel, and whose
principal activity on the case is to provide the recusal, is certainly subject to discipline.‖).
165. E.g., In re Mason, 736 A.2d 1019, 1022 (D.C. 1999) (finding that an attorney engaged in
conduct ―prejudicial to the administration of justice‖ when the attorney lied under oath to a federal
agency).
166. See, e.g., People v. Vsetecka, 893 P.2d 1309, 1310 (Colo. 1995) (per curiam) (offering to
pay firm to stop a disciplinary investigation); In re Wilson, 715 N.E.2d 838, 841 (Ind. 1999) (per
curiam) (inserting a term into a settlement agreement with a client that required the client to
withdraw a disciplinary complaint); In re Tartaglia, 798 N.Y.S.2d 458, 460–61 (N.Y. 2005) (per
curiam) (improperly interfering with an investigation into a complaint of professional
misconduct); In re Conduct of Boothe, 740 P.2d 785, 787, 790 (Or. 1987) (per curiam)
(negotiating with a client for an assurance that the client would not file litigation against an
attorney); Missouri Supreme Court Advisory Opinion, Formal Op. 122, at 1–2 (2006) (attempting
to ―purchase the silence of complainants‖ against an attorney). In some states, such conduct is
specifically prohibited by rule. See, e.g., ILL. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h) (West 2004
& Supp. 2008) (―A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement with a client or former client limiting
or purporting to limit the right of the client or former client to file or pursue any complaint before
the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.‖).
167. 756 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
168. Id. at 83, 87.
169. Id. at 87.
170. 540 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 2000).
171. Id. at 163–65.
172. Id. at 164–65 (quoting Daily Gazette Co. v. Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State
Bar, 326 S.E.2d 705, 706 (W. Va. 1984)); see also In re Discipline of Eicher, 661 N.W.2d 354,
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Several courts have also held that retaliation and intimidation directed
at others for their conduct in connection with the disciplinary process
amounts to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.173 In one
instance, an attorney was disciplined after threatening to retaliate against
individuals who filed disciplinary complaints against him by filing lawsuits
against them.174 In another, an attorney attempted to intimidate a witness in
a disciplinary proceeding against the attorney.175
By enforcing Rule 8.4(d) against law firm attorneys who retaliate
against other firm attorneys who participate in the disciplinary process,
disciplinary agencies and reviewing courts can further the goals underlying
the Model Rules while hopefully reducing the number of instances of
retaliation. The effects of retaliation are not limited to the immediate
victims of retaliation. Instead, employer retaliation is often an attempt to
send a warning to others not to engage in similar behavior.176 In the case of
retaliation against attorneys who comply with their ethical duty to report out
unethical conduct, retaliation has the effect of chilling participation in the
disciplinary process, a result that unquestionably ―impedes or subverts‖ the
disciplinary process. And as the purpose of the disciplinary process is to
safeguard the public interest in the administration of justice, retaliation
against attorneys who participate in the disciplinary process fits neatly
within the prohibition against conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice.
Of course, the ability of the existing ethics rules to combat retaliation
in the legal profession depends on both the willingness of attorneys to
report instances of retaliation and the willingness of disciplinary authorities
to prosecute lawyers and firms who engage in such action. Neither action is
particularly common at present. The organized bar‘s past experience with
enforcement, however, suggests the possibility that a few highly publicized
prosecutions under Rule 8.4(d) for retaliation might have the desired
deterrent effect.177

365 (S.D. 2003) (―Attempting to bargain away a disciplinary complaint also constitutes conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.‖ (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
173. E.g., Fla. Bar v. Perlmutter, 582 So. 2d 616, 617 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam); In re Friedland,
416 N.E.2d 433, 438–39 (Ind. 1981) (per curiam); In re Discipline of Eicher, 661 N.W.2d at 365.
174. Perlmutter, 582 So. 2d at 617.
175. In re Friedland, 416 N.E.2d at 435.
176. NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d 1086, 1088 (7th Cir. 1987).
177. When, for example, the Illinois Supreme Court disciplined an attorney solely for his
failure to report pursuant to Rule 8.3(a), ―Illinois‘s bar disciplinary authorities observed a
substantial increase in Rule 8.3 reports.‖ Perlman, supra note 31, at 475.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1447429

Long_PreliminaryBookProof(version2)

7/2/2009 10:12 AM

134

[VOL. 68:101

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
b.

Prohibiting Retaliation Against Internal Whistleblowers:
Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice, The
Duty to Report, and the Duties of Firm Partners and
Subordinate Lawyers

Disciplinary authorities and reviewing courts could take a similar
approach with respect to the problem of retaliation against those who make
internal reports of suspected misconduct. If, as discussed, law firm
retaliation or intimidation directed at an attorney who makes an external
report of misconduct amounts to conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice,178 then retaliation or intimidation that occurs because the firm
believes an attorney is contemplating or planning to file such a report is
equally prejudicial to the administration of the disciplinary process. Several
courts have sensibly concluded that this type of ―anticipatory retaliation‖
amounts to unlawful retaliation in the employment discrimination
context.179 As long as there is a causal connection between the adverse
action and the filing of the disciplinary complaint, it is immaterial whether
the adverse action occurred prior to or after the filing of the complaint; it is
retaliation and it undermines the disciplinary process.
Similarly, disciplinary authorities and reviewing courts could, in good
faith, recognize the existence of an implied ethical duty not to interfere with
the disciplinary process that is implicated with the filing of an internal
report of suspected misconduct. If, as at least one court has concluded,
Rule 8.3(a)‘s command that attorneys report serious misconduct to
disciplinary authorities implies a duty on the part of the subject attorney not
to interfere with the disciplinary process,180 then the theory of anticipatory
retaliation should make it unethical for the subject attorney to take adverse
action in anticipation of the filing of a disciplinary complaint. Provided the
reporting attorney has acted reasonably and in good faith in raising
concerns internally over suspected misconduct by another attorney, an
implied ethical duty on the part of firm partners exists not to retaliate
against or seek to intimidate the reporting attorney.
Likewise, disciplinary authorities might recognize the existence of an
implied ethical duty not to retaliate against an attorney who makes an
internal report of suspected misconduct stemming from Rules 5.1 and 5.2.
Rule 5.2 is clear that a subordinate attorney‘s violation of the ethical rules is
not excused simply because the subordinate was acting at the direction of a
178. See supra notes 160–175 and accompanying text.
179. E.g., Beckel v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 301 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2002); Sauers v. Salt
Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 1993); EEOC v. Bojangles Rests., Inc., 284 F. Supp.
2d 320, 328 (M.D.N.C. 2003); see also Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend, supra note 102, at
983–84 (explaining that several federal courts have held that anticipatory retaliation is actionable
in employment discrimination cases).
180. See supra notes 156–159 and accompanying text.
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superior.181 But the comments to Rule 5.2 just as clearly contemplate a
dialogue between the subordinate and a supervising attorney taking place
over ―reasonably arguable‖ questions of professional responsibility.182
Therefore, it hardly seems a great stretch to conclude that an implied ethical
duty exists on the part of firm partners not to retaliate against a subordinate
who, in good faith, raises ―reasonably arguable‖ questions concerning the
subordinate‘s ethical obligations in relation to a dialogue with a supervising
attorney.
Finally, a broader ethical duty might be said to exist in Rule 5.1(a)‘s
command that law firm partners ―make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in
the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.‖183 Simply stated, a
firm partner who retaliates against a firm attorney who has raised concerns
about the ethical behavior of another attorney has not made the ―reasonable
efforts‖ required by the rule. The same is true of the firm partner who
knows of the retaliation but stands silent as it occurs. The comments
explain that firms should implement measures to ―detect and resolve‖
possible ethical problems.184 Stifling internal reports of suspected
misconduct or permitting such stifling is the opposite of what the rule
envisions. Accordingly, state disciplinary authorities should treat such
conduct as a violation of Rule 5.1(a).185
3. Adopting Specific Anti-Retaliation Ethical Rules
Another partial solution to the problem of retaliation against attorneys
who make either external or internal reports of misconduct about another
attorney would be to adopt a new ethical rule prohibiting such conduct.
Federal whistleblower protection provisions are premised on the need to
preserve the willingness of employees to utilize the external mechanisms in
place to remedy unlawful conduct and the desirability of encouraging
internal opposition and reporting of unlawful conduct.186 The same logic
applies to imposing an explicit anti-retaliation or intimidation provision in a
jurisdiction‘s legal ethics code.

181. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 5.2 (2008).
182. Id. R. 5.2 cmt. 2.
183. Id. R. 5.1(a).
184. Id. R. 5.1 cmt. 2.
185. See Douglas R. Richmond, Law Firm Partners as Their Brothers’ Keepers, 96 KY. L.J.
231, 258–59 (2008) [hereinafter Richmond, Law Firm Partners], for an argument that the failure
of a law firm partner to raise questions internally about the possible misconduct of another firm
attorney may amount to a breach of fiduciary duty.
186. See supra notes 146–154 and accompanying text.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1447429

Long_PreliminaryBookProof(version2)

7/2/2009 10:12 AM

136

[VOL. 68:101

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

Lawyers will likely always be reluctant to report the misconduct of
another lawyer. Many non-lawyer employees are reluctant to report
wrongdoing for fear of retaliation, despite the existence of statutory antiretaliation provisions.187 Given the high value the legal profession places
on confidentiality, lawyers might, if anything, be more reluctant than nonlawyers to make an external report of wrongdoing. But this is all the more
reason why it makes sense to explicitly prohibit retaliation against lawyers
who take such action. In addition to providing some measure of assurance
for potential whistleblowers, an explicit prohibition on intimidation or
retaliation sends a message to lawyers that informing disciplinary
authorities about another lawyer‘s serious misconduct is not just an ethical
requirement the legal profession regards with a wink and a nod, but an
action that the profession values and encourages.
Of course, the protections afforded by Sarbanes-Oxley, Title VII, and
other measures are statutory in nature. The ethical rules governing
attorneys, while often codified, are not statutes in the literal sense and are
not designed to be the basis for civil or criminal liability.188 Therefore, the
inclusion of an anti-retaliation rule might raise two possible objections.
First, some might argue that there is something unseemly or unnatural about
including a prohibition on retaliation against whistleblowers in what is
fundamentally a code of ethics. However, most state codes of ethics
already contain other more mechanical and statute-like measures. Rule 8.1
already regulates the mechanics of the disciplinary process to some extent
by prohibiting lawyers from knowingly making false statements in
connection with the disciplinary process or failing to respond to a request
for information from a disciplinary authority.189 Rule 8.5 is simply a
choice of law provision wrapped up in ethical garb.190 Thus, an antiretaliation rule would not amount to an anomaly within the rules of
professional conduct.
Another possible objection is that an ethical rule prohibiting retaliation
would not, by itself, afford a discharged attorney any remedy. Some states
have enacted statutes designed to prevent interference with the operation of

187. See Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Why Didn’t She Just Report Him? The Psychological and
Legal Implications of Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 117, 122
(1995) (reporting results of study showing why employees do not report instances of
discrimination to their employers).
188. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT pmbl., cl. 20 (stating that the rules ―are not
designed to be a basis for civil liability‖).
189. Id. R. 8.1.
190. See id. R. 8.5 (noting the scope of disciplinary authority, and setting forth choice of law
provisions).
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other types of professional disciplinary processes191 or state ethics
commissions.192 Given the similarly important role that the legal
disciplinary rules and process play, individuals who report suspected
violations of these rules or who participate in the disciplinary process are
deserving of similar protection. Therefore, a separate whistleblower
protection statute for lawyers might be desirable. However, the inclusion of
an anti-retaliation provision within a state‘s ethics code might accomplish
two things. First, the inclusion of such a rule might amount to the clear
expression of public policy courts require in deciding whether to recognize
a common law tort claim of retaliatory discharge in violation of public
policy.193 Thus, the inclusion of an anti-retaliation rule might make it more
likely that a discharged attorney would obtain a remedy. In addition, the
inclusion of an anti-retaliation rule would be important because of the
statement it would make about the collective values of the legal
profession.194 Although a whistleblower statute might be desirable, it is
particularly appropriate for the legal profession—an almost entirely selfregulating profession—to adopt ethical rules providing this type of
protection in order to instill confidence in the public.195
191. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.990(6) (West 2008) (making it a misdemeanor to
impede, obstruct, threaten, or interfere with the State Board of Medical Licensure or any of its
members, or of any officer, agent, inspector, or investigator of the board, in the performance of
their duty to regulate the professional conduct of medical professionals).
192. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 4-2-6-13 (LexisNexis 2008) (prohibiting retaliation against
an employee because the employee filed a complaint with, provided information to, or testified
before state ethics commission). Other statutes make it illegal to retaliate against a health care
provider because the provider objects to or refuses to participate in what the provider reasonably
believes is a practice in violation of the law or the ethical standards of the medical profession and
that the provider reasonably believes poses a risk to public health. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 149, § 187(b)(3) (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2008).
193. See generally Long, Retaliatory Discharge, supra note 8, at 1090–97 (discussing the
possibility of a professional code of ethics to serve as the expression of public policy necessary to
support a retaliatory discharge claim).
194. See Brenda Jones Quick, Ethical Rules Prohibiting Discrimination by Lawyers: The Legal
Profession’s Response to Discrimination on the Rise, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL‘Y
5, 54 (1993) (noting the ability of ethical rules to send a message to the public about the values of
the legal profession).
195. Adopting such a provision might also increase the odds that whistleblowing attorneys
would prevail under the common law theory of retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy.
In deciding whether to recognize a retaliatory discharge claim, courts often impose the
requirement that the firing offend ―a clear public policy which is evidenced by an unambiguous
constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision.‖ Crews v. Buckman Labs. Int‘l, Inc., 78 S.W.3d
852, 864 (Tenn. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d
653, 657 (Ohio 1995) (stating that one element of a retaliatory discharge claim is that a ―‗clear
public policy existed and was manifested in a state or federal constitution, statute or administrative
regulation, or in the common law‘‖ (quoting Henry H. Perritt Jr., The Future of Wrongful
Dismissal Claims: Where Does Employer Self Interest Lie?, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 397, 398 (1989)).
The inclusion of an anti-retaliation provision within a jurisdiction‘s rules of professional conduct
might qualify.
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B. Structural Approach to the Plight of Whistleblowing Attorneys:
Improving Ethical Infrastructures
The enforcement measures described above would represent a
welcome change to the current state of affairs. However, they represent a
piecemeal approach to a larger problem. Although imposing discipline in
the case of retaliation against a whistleblowing attorney addresses one
aspect of the problem, the larger issue is that the ethical infrastructures of
many law firms lack any structure designed to encourage the internal
reporting, investigation, and resolution of ethical misconduct.
Currently, the Model Rules focus almost exclusively on external
reporting to disciplinary authorities as the means of addressing lawyer
misconduct. However, in light of the numerous problems associated with
the operation and enforcement of Rule 8.3(a)‘s external reporting
requirement, it is time that jurisdictions began experimenting with
encouraging the internal reporting of suspected misconduct. Therefore, this
Section suggests various ways the legal profession can encourage firms to
develop their ethical infrastructures, including internal reporting,
investigation, and resolution procedures.
1. The Benefits of Internal Whistleblowing
Although the duty to make external reports of serious misconduct to
disciplinary authorities plays an important role in rooting out unethical
practice, internal reporting of suspected lawyer misconduct offers several
advantages. Internal reporting is more consistent with traditional notions of
professional responsibility and, therefore, the self-image of most lawyers,
than external reporting. Therefore, it is more likely to be an effective
method of rooting out professional misconduct.
External reporting has two distinct disadvantages in terms of bringing
to light lawyer misconduct. First is the concern common to whistleblowers
of all kinds that ―reporting out‖ either amounts to disloyal conduct or will
be perceived as such. The traditional notion of employee loyalty involved
unquestioning faithfulness.196 Accordingly, the external whistleblower, in
particular, has long been viewed in some quarters as inherently disloyal.197

196. See Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 8) (explaining that pre-modern employment law
originated from master-servant principles in which ―a faithful servant employee followed orders
and exercised fidelity without question‖).
197. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Who Blows the Whistle to the
Media, and Why: Organizational Characteristics of Media Whistleblowers, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 151,
161–62 (1994) (characterizing arbitration decisions in the collective bargaining context as
concluding that ―whistleblowing to either government officials or the media constitutes ‗go[ing]
public,‘ which is detrimental to the employer and, thus, disloyal‖ (alteration in original)); Terry
Morehead Dworkin, Whistleblowing, MNCs, and Peace, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457, 463
n.42 (2002) (―Studies of whistleblowers indicate that the best predictor of retaliation is external
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To be sure, more modern conceptions of loyalty emphasize greater
independent judgment on the part of an employee.198 Furthermore, the
public‘s attitude toward whistleblowers has warmed in recent years because
of various corporate scandals.199 This trend is reflected in the ethical rules
governing lawyers as well.200 Under the former version of Rule 1.13, an
attorney who learned of an organizational client‘s serious wrongdoing was
precluded from notifying others outside of the organization about the
misconduct except to the extent the disclosure was permitted by one of the
narrow confidentiality exceptions.201 Under the revised Rule 1.13, after
―reporting up‖ the corporate ladder, an attorney who knows of client
misconduct is now permitted to ―report out‖ to the extent the attorney
―reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the
organization.‖202
Despite the general softening of attitude toward whistleblowing, there
is still considerable suspicion regarding external whistleblowers. Reporting
outside the confines of the organization potentially exposes the organization
to adverse publicity and financial harm.203 And regardless of one‘s
conception of employee loyalty, conduct that potentially exposes one‘s
employer to harm certainly raises concerns over loyalty, no matter how
noble the motivation.204 It is perhaps for this reason that employees
generally prefer an internal reporting option.205 As Professor Richard E.
Moberly has stated, ―An internal disclosure channel provides a way for

whistleblowing.‖ (citing Janet P. Near et al., Explaining the Whistle-Blowing Process: Suggestions
from Power Theory and Justice Theory, 4 ORG. SCI. 393, 399 (1993))); Jonathan Macey, Getting
The Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis of Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1901 (2007) (stating that whistleblowers ―traditionally have been considered
tattletales and otherwise viewed with suspicion‖).
198. See Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 8) (explaining that today employees are expected
to exercise ―discretion and independent judgment,‖ recognizing their role in ―assisting the
organization in operating within the bounds of legality‖).
199. See Macey, supra note 197, at 1901 (stating that whistleblowers ―have recently enjoyed a
distinct rise in popularity‖).
200. See Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley,
49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 732–33 (2004) (noting the changes to the Model Rules regarding disclosure
of client confidences following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley).
201. See id. at 802 n.300 (commenting on the former version of Model Rule 1.13(b)).
202. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c)(2) (2008).
203. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They
Working?, 25 AM. BUS. L.J. 241, 242 (1987) (stating that ―negative publicity, investigations, and
administrative and legal actions . . . usually ensue after external whistleblowing‖).
204. See Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 8) (―[A] loyal employee must view the good of
the organization as a whole and behave according to what is best for the future of the
corporation.‖).
205. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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employees to demonstrate their loyalty by disclosing misconduct without
having to report colleagues to ‗outside‘ authorities.‖206
Attorneys in law firms may be particularly susceptible to fears that
their external reports to disciplinary authorities of another attorney‘s
misconduct are either inherently disloyal or will be viewed as such.
Although working in any organization may produce feelings of loyalty
toward the organization, the special characteristics of law firm employment
are particularly likely to lead to loyalty of the blind obedience type.207 This
is undoubtedly one of the reasons why the external reporting obligation of
Rule 8.3(a) often goes unfulfilled.208 Some in the legal profession view
those who make external reports of wrongdoing with particular disdain, as
evidenced by the long list of derisive names for Rule 8.3(a), such as the
―squeal rule,‖209 the ―snitch rule,‖210 and the duty ―to ‗rat‘ on one‘s
colleagues.‖211 In short, external reporting of unethical conduct is at odds
with the self-image of many lawyers.
The second disadvantage of a system of external reporting of ethical
misconduct is that a lawyer‘s duty of confidentiality may prevent the lawyer
from ever making the report. When a lawyer‘s duty to make an external
report of misconduct comes into conflict with a lawyer‘s duty not to reveal
information relating to the representation of a client without the client‘s
consent under Rule 1.6,212 the duty of confidentiality prevails.213 Although
a comment to Rule 8.3(a) advises that ―a lawyer should encourage a client
to consent to disclosure where prosecution would not substantially
prejudice the client‘s interests,‖214 a client‘s lack of consent prevents a
lawyer from ethically making a report of misconduct to disciplinary
206. Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model to Encourage Corporate
Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1142.
207. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text.
208. See Douglas R. Richmond, The Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A Practical
Analysis of Lawyer Self-regulation, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 202 (1999) [hereinafter
Richmond, Duty to Report] (stating that when ―an unethical lawyer and a potential reporting
lawyer work in the same law firm, there is little chance that even serious misconduct will be
reported to disciplinary authorities‖ due to the reporting lawyer‘s sense of loyalty and fear of
retaliation).
209. Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., “Squeal Rule” Considered for Change, NAT‘L L.J., Mar. 26,
1990, at 13.
210. R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a
Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to “Seek Justice,” 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 682 (2006).
211. Larry O. Natt Gantt II et al., Professional Responsibility and the Christian Attorney:
Comparing the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Biblical Virtues, 19 REGENT U. L.
REV. 1, 87 (2006).
212. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R 1.6(a) (2008).
213. See id. R. 8.3 cmt. 2 (―A report about misconduct is not required where it would involve
violation of Rule 1.6.‖).
214. Id. (emphasis added).
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authorities. Therefore, at least some serious misconduct is unlikely to go
reported to disciplinary authorities as a result of the interplay between rules.
Internal reporting within a firm presents no such problems. As a result, an
internal reporting process has distinct advantages in terms of addressing
misconduct that would otherwise go unreported.215
An internal reporting device offers a number of other benefits. As
discussed, establishing a process whereby attorneys can raise concerns of
unethical behavior internally before that behavior has harmful consequences
for clients makes practical sense for law firms in terms of litigation and
reputational costs.216 Relying on institutional theory, Professors Chambliss
and Wilkins have suggested that the creation of a formal, ethical
infrastructure may also signal to key constituents, such as clients and
potential firm members, that the firm has high ethical standards—a
characteristic the firm may use as a selling point.217 From the perspective
of the legal profession more broadly, the existence of an effective internal
reporting device also relieves some of the burden on disciplinary
authorities, thereby allowing authorities to save enforcement costs and
direct their efforts in a more efficient manner.218 Part of the justification
for Rule 8.3(a) is that lawyers are better situated to detect and recognize
unethical conduct on the part of other lawyers than are clients.219 If this is
true, then lawyers within the same firm are uniquely positioned to detect the
misconduct of their colleagues and fulfill the goals of the rule.220
The legal profession‘s embrace of such devices would also send a
welcome and much-needed signal to the public that the profession truly is
capable of policing its members. An external reporting requirement that is
vague, rarely enforced, and infrequently followed may lead to the view,
both within the legal profession and outside, that the legal profession is not

215. See generally Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 27) (noting that, due in part to
confidentiality concerns, ―internal speech is frequently the most reasonable, if not the only, path
for an employee who witnesses‖ misconduct).
216. See id. (―[A]llowing the employer to first investigate and correct possible violations
prevents potential high costs to both the employee and the organization, which will avoid harms to
its reputation and the costs of undergoing a government investigation.‖); see generally Davis,
supra note 18, at 106 (discussing the need for law firms to have clearly defined reporting
procedures to ensure effective management).
217. Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 24, at 710.
218. Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 27).
219. See Greenbaum, supra note 63, at 265 (explaining that lawyers, ―because of their training
in the law, and their day-to-day interactions with other lawyers, are better situated than most to
observe and evaluate the conduct of other attorneys‖).
220. See Richmond, Duty to Report, supra note 208, at 203 (―[C]olleagues are almost surely
best positioned to observe and act on misconduct by other lawyers in their firms.‖).
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willing to regulate itself.221 This is especially true when the profession
does little to nothing to protect those who actually obey the rule and suffer
adverse consequences as a result.222
But most importantly, the establishment of effective, formal structures
for dealing with internal reports of unethical conduct contributes to a sense
of shared values within an organization, which makes it more likely that
firm lawyers will come forward with concerns about misconduct within the
firm.223 The existence of a formal, internal reporting process sends a
message to the members of a law firm that professionalism and compliance
with ethical rules are a shared value and that the firm takes seriously any
individual concerns in this regard.224 In this regard, the creation of such a
formal process is, in the words of Professors Chambliss and Wilkins,
―culturally symbolic.‖225 But the symbolism may also produce practical
results. Although whistleblowers understandably fear retaliation, one of the
strongest disincentives to whistleblowing is the whistleblower‘s fear that
the employer will do nothing to address the whistleblower‘s concerns.226
By instituting formal policies and procedures for handling internal reports
of unethical conduct—including assurances that no retaliation will occur—
law firms can help alleviate both of these concerns.227 In addition, where a
law firm demonstrates a formal commitment to being receptive to ethical
concerns, an institutional norm of ethical practice may be more likely to
develop.228
Of course, it is unlikely that there will be a massive rise in the number
of internal reports of misconduct should such formal procedures become the
norm in the legal profession. The pressures—both intrinsic and extrinsic to
the legal profession—that dissuade attorneys from reporting misconduct to
disciplinary authorities will also undoubtedly dissuade some attorneys from
221. See Greenbaum, supra note 63, at 275–76 (stating that a poorly drafted rule harms the
public image of the profession).
222. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
223. See Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 27) (explaining the benefits of an effective
internal reporting system); see generally Davis, supra note 18, at 109 (stating a law firm‘s culture
is ―not an adequate basis for uniform risk management‖ and that written policies and procedures
related to risk management are necessary).
224. See generally Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure, supra
note 24, at 713 (stating that the creation of internal compliance procedures signals to lawyers that
the firm takes ethics seriously).
225. Id.
226. Moberly, supra note 206, at 1143–44.
227. See id. at 1143 (arguing that the structure of an organization‘s internal reporting process
can reduce concerns over disloyalty and retaliation).
228. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 24, at
714 (drawing upon organizational theory to argue that a relationship exists between structure and
development of a culture).
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taking advantage of whatever internal reporting system a law firm may
implement. However, as between a system that relies exclusively on
external reporting and a system that relies on both internal and external
reporting to root out misconduct, the choice should be obvious. Ultimately,
the legal profession must encourage its members to develop internal
reporting procedures to complement the pre-existing duty to report
misconduct to disciplinary authorities.
2. The Requirement That Firms Have an Internal Process for the
Reporting and Investigation of Suspected Misconduct Is Implicit
in Rule 5.1(a)
Assuming that the legal profession should encourage greater reliance
on internal reporting of suspected misconduct, the question becomes how
this can best be achieved. One could rely on law firms to voluntarily
develop such procedures out of a sense of self-interest. Even if one takes
such an optimistic view of the willingness of law firms to take such steps,
the existence of such procedures would be spotty. A better solution would
be to interpret Rule 5.1(a) as requiring the existence of such procedures and
enforcing the rule accordingly against individual law firm partners or
partners in management or policy-making positions.
a.

Rule 5.1(a)’s Implicit Requirement that Firms Have an
Internal Process for the Reporting and Investigation of
Suspected Misconduct

As written, Rule 5.1(a) could support the imposition of a duty to have
an internal reporting system in place. At present, a law firm partner has a
duty to ―make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect
measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform
to the Rules of Professional Conduct.‖229 Thus, partners have a duty to
make reasonable efforts to, in the words of a comment to the rule, ―detect
and resolve‖ ethical violations committed by any member of the firm. 230
Surely then, a law firm must do something to increase the odds that ethical
violations will be brought to the attention of relevant individuals within the
firm (detection) and dealt with appropriately (resolution). And the
comments are clear that when the rule uses the term ―measures,‖ it is
referring to ―policies and procedures‖ and ―systems‖231—that is,
infrastructure. As a specific example of such policies and procedures, a
Michigan ethics opinion states that under its version of Rule 5.1 ―each firm

229. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2008) (emphasis added).
230. Id. R. 5.1 cmt. 2.
231. Id. cmts. 2 & 3.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1447429

Long_PreliminaryBookProof(version2)

7/2/2009 10:12 AM

144

[VOL. 68:101

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

is obligated to establish and administer a record retention policy or plan, to
educate all lawyers and nonlawyers in the firm as to its operation, and to
monitor compliance.‖232
Of course, many law firms have failed to develop internal compliance
policies and procedures in other areas, such as billing procedures,233 where
the rule would seem to mandate it. The failure of firms to do so, however,
is hardly an argument for why no such duty exists. In other areas, Rule
5.1(a)‘s malleable ―reasonable efforts‖ and ―reasonable assurance‖
language makes the establishment of bright-line rules mandating certain
types of compliance procedures undesirable. It would make little sense, for
example, to require that a large law firm have a single, across-the-board
policy dictating to attorneys how they must keep track of filing and other
important deadlines.
Promulgating an internal reporting and investigation policy is a
different matter. Although such systems might take any number of forms
depending upon the size and structure of a law firm, providing a mechanism
by which suspected misconduct can be addressed internally goes to the
essence of what Rule 5.1(a) is about. Without such a mechanism, it is
virtually impossible for a firm to give ―reasonable assurance that all lawyers
in the firm conform‖ to a jurisdiction‘s ethical rules. In addition, unlike the
case of procedures for keeping track of filing deadlines, where individual
attorneys in a firm may have their own acceptable preferences, firm
attorneys need a uniform policy for addressing suspected misconduct if the
firm is to deal with such matters effectively—no matter the size of the firm.
A New York ethics opinion suggests that the existence of a system that
encourages internal reporting and that provides for investigation and
resolution of suspected misconduct is an integral component of compliance
with Rule 5.1(a).234 According to the opinion, a firm has a duty to have
―procedures in place to respond to ethical inquiries or lapses.‖235 In
addition, a firm has ―a duty to make inquiries where it has reason to believe

232. State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof‘l and Judicial Ethics, Op. No. R-5 (1989),
available at http://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/numbered_opinions/r-005.htm (last visited
May 13, 2009).
233. See Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy, supra note 7, at 128 (noting that most firms lack
billing guidelines and ―do little or nothing to train new associates about proper billing
procedures‖).
234. The duty for New York attorneys is contained in the New York Lawyer‘s Code of
Professional Responsibility. See N.Y. LAWYER‘S CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-104(A)
(2007) (requiring a law firm to ―make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm
conform to the disciplinary rules‖).
235. N.Y. State Bar Ass‘n, Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics, Opinion No. 762, at 6 (2003), available at
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cf
m&CONTENTID=18773 (last visited May 13, 2009).
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there is a likelihood that there may be ethical problems.‖236 These
statements suggest the existence of a duty to investigate and respond to
allegations of possible misconduct by attorneys within the firm. Thus, a
firm fails to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect
measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm are
practicing in an ethical manner where the firm lacks a device for
investigating and responding to suspected misconduct that is brought to the
firm‘s attention. What these measures might look like is discussed in
greater detail below.237
Rule 5.1(a) applies to an individual lawyer‘s reasonable efforts, but not
to those of a whole firm. But in New York, the duty is on a law firm to
―make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm conform to
the disciplinary rules.‖238 However, the central message of the opinion—
that ―reasonable efforts‖ to detect and resolve unethical conduct necessarily
include some type of reporting, investigation, and resolution procedure—
applies with equal force to current Rule 5.1(a).
b. Implying a Duty on the Part of Firm Leaders to Establish an
Internal Process for the Reporting and Investigation of
Suspected Misconduct
Don’t blame you, don’t blame me, blame the fellow behind the
239
tree.
A complimentary approach would be to impose a duty on firm leaders
to develop internal reporting, investigation, and resolution measures.
Because Rule 5.1(a) is a rule of individual professional responsibility, it
may be difficult to identify which partners failed to make the reasonable
efforts required to ensure that the firm has an ethical infrastructure in place.
This is arguably one of the rule‘s failings. The size or complex bureaucracy
of some law firms may make it difficult for disciplinary authorities to
determine which partners made what efforts to influence the development
of a firm‘s ethical infrastructure.240 Moreover, a firm‘s structure may limit

236. Id.
237. See infra Part IV.B.3.
238. N.Y. LAWYER‘S CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-104(A) (2007); see Lachman,
supra note 66, at 1 (noting that New York‘s ethics codes provide for law firm discipline).
239. Cf. Editorial, Everybody Else Did It, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2008, at A14 (crediting the late
Senator Russell Long as stating that the core truth of tax policy was ―Don‘t tax you, don‘t tax me,
tax the fellow behind the tree‖).
240. See Schneyer, supra note 4, at 10–11 (stating that it is difficult to identify the parties
responsible for a firm‘s failure to develop an ethical infrastructure ―because it is difficult to
attribute omissions to specific individuals in a group‖); see also Elizabeth Chambliss & David B.
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the managerial and decision-making authority that some partners
possess.241 Therefore, as a practical matter, some partners possess little
ability to influence firm policy, let alone the ability to ensure that the firm
maintains internal policies and procedures designed to promote the ethical
practice of law.
Firm leaders, however, stand in different shoes. Many law firms now
employ centralized management structures which delegate much of the
firm‘s business management to relatively few individuals.242 For some of
these individuals, management of the firm constitutes their sole or primary
duty.243 As a result of this delegation of authority, many firm partners lack
the practical ability to monitor the actions of other partners or influence
firm policy regarding monitoring.244 But a law firm‘s managing partner or
members of a firm‘s management committee possess the ability to enact
internal policies and procedures designed to promote compliance with the
ethical rules. For purposes of Rule 5.1(a), the buck should stop with them.
For example, the comments following Tennessee‘s current version of Rule
5.1 specifically acknowledge this reality by providing that when a law
firm‘s partners delegate centralized managerial authority to a single or small
group of individuals, only those individuals are subject to the duty imposed
by Rule 5.1(a).245
A 2003 decision from the Delaware Supreme Court hints at the idea of
a heightened duty on the part of managing partners, and those in similar
positions of authority, to ensure that firms have measures in place that
guarantee attorneys are practicing in an ethical manner. In re Bailey246 is a
disciplinary case involving a managing partner charged with violations of
Rule 1.15.247 Specifically, an audit had revealed ―numerous deficiencies in
Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm Discipline, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 335, 339 (2003)
[hereinafter Chambliss & Wilkins, A New Framework] (noting similar concerns).
241. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
242. See Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy, supra note 7, at 127 (―Most large law firms have
moved away from decentralized, collegial governance and instead have extensive management
hierarchies . . . .‖).
243. See id. (noting that members of the law firm management hierarchy often include
―professional (full-time, specialized) managers‖).
244. See Robert W. Hillman, Whatever Happened to the Market for Partners’ Desks? The
Milberg Indictment as an Inquiry into Accountability, 2 MD. J. BUS. & TECH. L. 415, 423 (2007)
(stating that such delegation ―lessens the role of partners in monitoring the actions of each other‖).
245. TENN. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 5.1 cmt. 1 (2008).
246. 821 A.2d 851 (Del. 2003) (per curiam).
247. Id. at 853. The partner was also charged with violations related to dishonesty, conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice, and failure to supervise non-lawyer employees. Id. at
856. However, the crux of the court‘s opinion and the disciplinary charges involved Rule 1.15
violations. See id. at 853 (explaining that the primary issue in the case was whether the managing
partner engaged in misconduct with respect to the mishandling of the law firm‘s books and
records).
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the [f]irm‘s bookkeeping obligations.‖248
Addressing the partner‘s
argument that he had not engaged in ―knowing misconduct‖ for purposes of
imposing discipline, the court stated that even if there was no evidence that
the partner had ordered or implicitly directed the invasion of client funds,
―the sustained and systematic failure of a managing partner to supervise a
firm‘s employees to ensure compliance with Rule 1.15 may not be
characterized as simple negligence.‖249 Specifically, it was the partner‘s
role as managing partner that supported the court‘s conclusion. According
to the court, ―the managing partner of a law firm has enhanced duties, vis-àvis other lawyers and employees of the firm, to ensure the law firm‘s
compliance with its recordkeeping and tax obligations under the Delaware
Lawyers‘ Rules of Professional Conduct.‖250 Although recognizing that a
managing partner cannot guarantee flawless accounting, ―it is the managing
partner‘s responsibility to implement reasonable safeguards to ensure that
the firm is meeting its obligations with respect to its books and records.‖251
There are several reasons to be cautious about reading In re Bailey too
broadly. For example, the managing partner in question was not charged
with a Rule 5.1(a) violation for failure to take reasonable steps to ensure
that the firm had measures in place to promote compliance with the rules
regarding safeguarding client property and bookkeeping.252 That said, a
fair reading of the opinion establishes that the court‘s conclusion about the
―enhanced duties‖ of a managing partner is grounded every bit as much on
the principles underlying Rule 5.1(a) as it is the special rules regarding
maintaining client property and bookkeeping. In a footnote, the court stated
that it actually found support for its conclusion about those with managerial
authority for a law firm in a comment accompanying Rule 5.1.253 Indeed,
in a subsequent decision, the Delaware Supreme Court associated In re
Bailey with the responsibilities of firm managers under Rule 5.1.254
The existence of internal measures for ensuring compliance with the
ethical rules regarding bookkeeping and the safeguarding of client funds is
248. Id. at 854.
249. Id. at 863–64 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
250. Id. at 853.
251. Id. at 865.
252. Moreover, under Delaware‘s Rules of Professional Conduct, attorneys were required to
certify that their accounting practices were in compliance with the Rules, and law firm attorneys
could generally satisfy this requirement by expressly stating that they were relying on their firm‘s
managing partner‘s assurance that the firm itself was in compliance with the rules. Id. at 864 n.30.
253. See id. at 865 n.31 (describing Delaware‘s ethical rules with respect to managerial
authority). The comment was apparently not in effect at the time of the disciplinary change, but
had recently been adopted in Delaware. See id. (noting the effective date of the new ethics
provisions).
254. See In re Froelich, 838 A.2d 1117, 1120 n.13 (Del. 2003) (per curiam) (discussing the
court‘s earlier decision in In re Bailey).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1447429

Long_PreliminaryBookProof(version2)

7/2/2009 10:12 AM

148

[VOL. 68:101

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

simply one facet of a firm‘s ethical infrastructure. If a managing partner has
special responsibilities by virtue of Rule 5.1 for ensuring that the firm has
measures in place to comply with the ethical rules in the specific context of
safeguarding of client funds, then it logically follows that a managing
partner has special responsibilities concerning the development of other
aspects of the firm‘s ethical infrastructure. Every law firm partner has the
obligation to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and
procedures designed to ensure firm-wide compliance with the ethical
rules.255 The concept of ―reasonableness,‖ however, varies depending upon
the circumstances. A reasonable person is required to exercise any superior
abilities the person may possess.256 The leadership of a law firm (such as
managing partners and members of management, executive, or similar
committees) possesses the ability to set firm policy and implement change.
Therefore, it should be a relatively simple matter for such individuals to
establish internal reporting and investigation policies and procedures.
Because such policies and procedures are essential to fulfilling the purpose
of Rule 5.1, it should be the unusual case where a managing partner or
similar figure should be able to avoid discipline where a firm lacks such
measures.257
Directing enforcement efforts toward firm leaders also has practical
advantages for disciplinary authorities.
Perhaps one reason why
enforcement efforts under Rule 5.1(a) have been so lacking is because
disciplinary authorities are reluctant to discipline partners for acts of
omission rather than acts of commission.258 However, another possible
explanation might be that the size and structure of many firms simply
makes it extremely difficult for disciplinary authorities to enforce the rule.
Unless disciplinary authorities are willing to take a dart-board approach and
randomly target selected partners to see if they have complied with the rule,
they must investigate every partner‘s efforts to establish internal
compliance procedures and policies. In contrast, once disciplinary

255. See Epstein, supra note 18, at 1024 (citing the opinion of an ethics expert with respect to
law firm partners‘ duty to establish measures that ensure attorneys in a firm conform to the rules
and standards of professional conduct).
256. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 cmt. m (1965) (explaining that the
reasonable person ―is required to exercise the superior qualities that he has in a manner reasonable
under the circumstances‖).
257. See Richmond, Law Firm Partners, supra note 185, at 240 (―[L]aw firm leaders are more
likely to violate [Rule 5.1(a)] than are average partners . . . .‖); see generally Lachman, supra note
66, at 6 (―[A] strong argument can be made that the managing lawyers who have failed to take
[steps to ensure that all lawyers are in compliance with the ethical rules] should bear at least some
responsibility for the underlying misconduct resulting from that failure.‖).
258. See Miller, supra note 70, at 292–93 (explaining the difficulties with imposing
disciplinary sanctions against partners and supervising attorneys).
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authorities identify the locus of a firm‘s decision-making authority—a
relatively easy task—they can direct their attention to these individuals.
In short, courts and disciplinary authorities should read Rule 5.1(a), as
written, as imposing a duty upon law firm partners to make reasonable
efforts to ensure that the firm has in place an internal complaint and
investigation procedure through which attorneys can raise concerns over
suspected misconduct. And, at least in the case of firm leaders, the rule
should also be read as typically imposing a duty to see to it that the firm
actually develops such policies and procedures.
3. The Creation of a Firm-Wide Duty to Establish an Ethical
Infrastructure, Including a Process for the Reporting and
Investigation of Suspected Misconduct
Enforcing Rule 5.1(a) against firm partners or firm leaders who fail to
establish an internal process for the reporting and investigation of suspected
misconduct would represent an improvement on the current state of affairs.
However, in order for Rule 5.1(a) to fulfill its purposes, it should be
amended to impose a firm-wide duty with respect to the implementation of
a law firm‘s ethical infrastructure, rather than simply an individual duty. In
doing so, the legal profession should look to recent reforms in corporate
governance.
a. Firm-Wide Responsibility for the Establishment of an Ethical
Infrastructure
Any discussion of professional discipline for law firms begins with a
1990 article by Professor Ted Schneyer. In the article, Professor Schneyer
focused primarily on Rule 5.1(a) and the development of a firm‘s ethical
infrastructure.259 Since that time, various authors have debated the merits
of imposing discipline against a firm as a whole for its failures in this
regard.
Opponents have raised a number of objections to firm-wide discipline
in general and such discipline more specifically in the case of Rule 5.1(a).
These include the arguments that such discipline is unnecessary because
most law firms (at least large ones) already have ethical infrastructures in
place260 and unfair because it subjects ―innocent‖ partners to fines and
other sanctions stemming from conduct they had nothing to do with.261
Whatever the merits of these arguments, the objection that has thus far had
259. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 4, at 18 (discussing the use of Rule 5.1(a) as a tool to
establish an effective ethical infrastructure).
260. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (reporting that most large law firms have
ethical infrastructures in place).
261. Richmond, Law Firm Partners, supra note 185, at 262–63.
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the most traction is that firm-wide discipline would reduce individual
accountability.262 In short, imposing a duty on a law firm as a whole to
institute policies and procedures designed to promote the ethical practice of
law, opponents argue, would encourage attorneys to ―shirk their own
supervisory duties‖263 and lead to a ―lack of personal responsibility for
ethics compliance‖ more generally.264 Indeed, it was this concern over
reducing personal accountability that led the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission
to narrowly decide against adopting such a firm-wide duty.265
There are several responses to this argument. One is the point raised
previously that, even if every partner in a firm were inclined to make
reasonable efforts to develop the firm‘s ethical infrastructure, the structure
of many law firms effectively precludes the ability of some partners to do
so.266 Another response is that in light of the unwillingness or inability of
partners to effectuate meaningful change and the unwillingness or inability
of disciplinary authorities to enforce the rule as written, it is difficult to see
how imposing firm-wide discipline would lead to an increase in individual
shirking.267 If anything, law firm discipline for failure to make reasonable
efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm are practicing in an ethical
manner seems more likely to lead firm partners to take an active interest in
the firm‘s ethical infrastructure.268 Given the lack of enforcement of the
current rule, partners have reduced incentive for taking an interest in the
monitoring and supervision of other attorneys whose actions do not directly
impact the partner.
Ultimately, perhaps the strongest response to opponents of law firm
discipline in this context is that because the rule seeks to encourage firmwide policies and procedures designed to ensure compliance with the
262. See Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy, supra note 7, at 125 (recognizing the ―key
argument‖ against firm-wide liability that such a rule could undermine individual accountability).
263. Id. at 126.
264. Julie Rose O‘Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to Professor
Schneyer’s Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 21 (2002); see also Richmond, Law Firm
Partners, supra note 185, at 262 (arguing that firm-wide discipline ―reduces the likelihood that
individual lawyers will comply with ethics rules‖); see generally Davis, supra note 18, at 95–96
(noting the argument that reliance on ethics advisors and committees within law firms may cause
firm lawyers to shift responsibility for ethical decisionmaking and moral judgment to others).
265. Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy, supra note 7, at 125; Margaret Colgate Love, The
Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 470–71 (2002).
266. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
267. See Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy, supra note 7, at 129 (―Law firm discipline may not
be the answer to inadequate supervision, but it is hard to argue that law firm discipline could make
matters worse.‖).
268. See Schneyer, supra note 4, at 8 (explaining that under the current model of individual
liability, firm partners have ―an incentive to shift responsibility for an ethical breach onto others in
the firm‖).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1447429

Long_PreliminaryBookProof(version2)

2009]

7/2/2009 10:12 AM

ATTORNEYS AND ETHICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

151

ethical rules, it is only fitting that the duty to develop those policies rest
with the firm itself. Currently, Rule 5.1(a) speaks directly to the
responsibility of an individual lawyer to influence a firm‘s compliance
procedures. But the ultimate focus of the rule is on the firm itself. The goal
of the rule is ―to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm‖ are practicing in an ethical
fashion.269 Although the legal profession should certainly encourage
individual partners to be actively engaged in the process of shaping formal
policies and procedures within a firm, it is the end result that is most
important in this context.
An organization‘s policies represent the organization‘s official
position on a matter and may be relevant for purposes of determining the
organization‘s civil liability in other contexts.270 In the employment
discrimination context, for example, the existence of an anti-harassment
policy with a complaint and investigation procedure that allows a company
to effectively respond to a sexual harassment complaint internally may limit
the employer‘s vicarious liability for such harassment.271 Why then should
a law firm, which stands to benefit or incur liability on the basis of its
policies and procedures in other contexts, be excused from professional
discipline on the basis or absence of its compliance policies and
procedures?272
b. Lessons from Corporate Law
Recent corporate law reforms provide one possible model for the
revision of Rule 5.1.273 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains a rough analogue
to Rule 5.1 in terms of the development of ethical infrastructures. In order

269. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2008) (emphasis added).
270. See, e.g., Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 445 F.3d 586, 592–93 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)
(discussing employer‘s official and unofficial policies as the bases for potential liability in a
breach of contract action).
271. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (explaining that
employers can raise as a defense to vicarious liability for sexual harassment the existence of an
anti-harassment policy with a compliant procedure).
272. One response is that as between a rule of individual discipline and firm discipline, the rule
least likely to produce negative consequences for individual attorneys is, paradoxically, a rule of
individual discipline. Thus, it is the rule the legal profession has chosen. See Benjamin H.
Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV.
453, 454 (2008) (advancing the proposition that many legal issues are ―decided in the way that
offers the best result for the legal profession‖ as a whole).
273. See generally Schneyer, supra note 4, at 23–24 (suggesting the appropriateness of
corporate criminal liability as an analogy to law firm discipline).
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to increase investor confidence in the accuracy of financial information,274
the Act requires publicly traded companies to adopt a code of ethics or to
explain to the Securities and Exchange Commission (―SEC‖) why they
have not done so.275 According to SEC regulations, a code of ethics is a set
of written standards that are:
reasonably designed to deter wrongdoing and to promote:
(1) Honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical handling of
actual or apparent conflicts of interest between personal and
professional relationships;
(2) Full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure in
reports and documents that a registrant files with, or submits to,
the Commission and in other public communications made by the
registrant;
(3) Compliance with applicable governmental laws, rules and
regulations;
(4) The prompt internal reporting of violations of the code to an
appropriate person or persons identified in the code; and
(5) Accountability for adherence to the code.276
Like Rule 5.1, Sarbanes-Oxley and accompanying regulations seek to
encourage publicly traded corporations to promote ethical and lawful
conduct. They go further than Rule 5.1, however, in that they more
explicitly require corporations to develop internal structures for dealing
with possible misconduct and more explicitly require a locus of
responsibility for the corporation‘s handling of misconduct.
As discussed, Sarbanes-Oxley provides protection from retaliation for
internal whistleblowers.277 However, it does more than simply provide
protection for those who make internal reports of misconduct. Under
Section 301, a company‘s audit committee must establish procedures for
―the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints received by the issuer
regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters.‖278
An audit committee must also establish procedures for ―the confidential,
anonymous submission by employees of the issuer of concerns regarding
questionable accounting or auditing matters.‖279 If a publicly traded
corporation fails to implement these procedures, the national securities

274. See Cherry, supra note 45, at 1055 (explaining that the purpose of Sarbanes-Oxley Act is
―to increase transparency in financial markets, which allows investors to rely on the accuracy of
financial information‖).
275. 15 U.S.C. § 7264(a) (2006).
276. 17 C.F.R. § 229.406(b) (2008).
277. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
278. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(A) (2006).
279. Id. § 78j-1(m)(4)(B).
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exchanges and national securities associations are prohibited from listing
the securities of the corporation.280
Sarbanes-Oxley does not require that a corporation adopt any
particular reporting procedure.281 The SEC opined that the circumstances
and needs of a small issuer with relatively few employees might be
completely different than those of a large, multi-national issuer and,
therefore, a ―one-size-fits-all‖ approach was undesirable.282 The failings of
pre-Sarbanes-Oxley internal reporting procedures, however, provide a clue
as to what procedures the SEC and Congress envisioned. Prior to SarbanesOxley, many corporations adopted internal reporting systems in which
reports ―flowed up through the corporate management hierarchy.‖283 Out
of either self-interest or concerns about sanctions against the corporation,
corporate executives often failed to pass along the relevant information to
the corporation‘s directors.284 According to the SEC, an internal reporting
procedure must ―cultivate open and effective channels of information.‖285
For this reason, it may be that in order for a company‘s complaint
procedure to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley, complaints about accounting
practices must be routed to a corporation‘s audit committee, a committee
that, under the Act, must consist entirely of independent directors who
receive no compensatory fee when acting within their committee or board
capacity.286 Regardless of the exact form a corporation‘s reporting
procedure takes, any effective procedure will have a mechanism by which
employees may bypass the traditional management hierarchy.287 In theory,

280. Id. § 78j-1(m)(1)(A).
281. See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,798 (Apr.
16, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249 and 274) (clarifying that the SEC is
―not mandating specific procedures that the audit committee must establish‖).
282. Id.
283. See Moberly, supra note 206, at 1135.
284. Id. (explaining that disclosure channels requiring complaints to flow through the corporate
hierarchy placed employee disclosures ―at risk of management blocking and filtering‖).
285. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed. Reg. at 18,798.
286. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(A)–(B) (2006) (setting forth the criteria for an audit
committee); Marian Exall, Compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley Complaint Procedures Requirement
Could Prove Challenge to Audit Committees, CORP. COUNS. WKLY. NEWSL. (Bureau of Nat‘l
Affairs), June 25, 2003 (―The audit committee must be intimately involved in the receipt and
handling of employee complaints, as well as making initial decisions about the implementation of
the process.‖); Moberly, supra note 206, at 1138 (stating that Sarbanes-Oxley requires that
independent directors on the board's audit committee receive whistleblower disclosures).
287. See Exall, supra note 286 (―An existing procedure that directs all complaints to
management, and leaves it up to management to decide whether and how to investigate, will not
be adequate.‖); see also Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed. Reg. at
18,798 (providing that ―[m]anagement may not have the appropriate incentives to self-report all
questionable practices‖ and that an ―employee or other individual may be reticent to report
concerns regarding questionable accounting or other matters for fear of management reprisal‖).
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such procedures should lead to more internal reporting of suspected
misconduct and less retaliation from management.288
The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (―OSG‖), which were
amended in 2004 following numerous corporate scandals,289 place a similar
emphasis on the use of formal structures to promote ―an organizational
culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance
with the law.‖290 Under the OSG, a corporation‘s criminal penalties for
violations of law may be increased or reduced depending upon the absence
or presence of ―an effective compliance and ethics program.‖291 An
effective program is one that is reasonably designed, implemented, and
enforced so that it generally will be effective in preventing and detecting
criminal conduct.292 This also necessarily entails responding appropriately
to criminal conduct once it has been detected and taking adequate
disciplinary measures against individuals who have engaged in criminal
conduct or failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or detect criminal
conduct.293
The OSG make clear that an essential part of an effective compliance
and ethics program is a formal procedure that allows employees to raise
concerns about possibly unlawful conduct without fear of retaliation. This
procedure may include ―mechanisms that allow for anonymity or
confidentiality, whereby the organization‘s employees and agents may
report or seek guidance regarding potential or actual criminal conduct.‖294
As mentioned, Sarbanes-Oxley similarly requires that a corporation‘s audit
committee develop procedures for confidential, anonymous reporting of
concerns over questionable practices.295
Such measures should,
theoretically, encourage employees to be more forthcoming about their
concerns of illegal or unethical behavior taking place within an

288. See Moberly, supra note 206, at 1143 (stating that requiring upper levels of the
corporation to receive complaints reduces retaliation from supervisors and managers and
encourages more whistleblowing as a result).
289. Id. at 1134 n.125.
290. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a)(2) (2008).
291. Id. § 8B2.1(a).
292. Id. § 8B2.1(a)(2).
293. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(6)–(7).
294. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5)(C).
295. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
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organization.296 At least partly in response to these measures, anonymous
ethics hotlines are now increasingly common in the corporate world.297
A similar idea exists in the employment discrimination field.
Employers may sometimes avoid vicarious liability for a supervisor‘s
unlawful harassment of an employee if they adopt effective mechanisms
that allow for the reporting, investigation, and resolution of suspected
discrimination.298 In order to avail itself of the defense, an employer must
effectively communicate the existence of its policies and procedures to its
employees.299
Finally, both Sarbanes-Oxley and the OSG contain provisions
requiring companies to develop accountability measures. Both require that
a corporation have designated individuals who are responsible for the
development and implementation of compliance procedures. SarbanesOxley designates specifically a corporation‘s audit committee as having this
responsibility.300 The OSG do not identify any particular individuals
within an organization as being the responsible parties, but they do make
clear that a corporation‘s board of directors and ―[h]igh-level personnel‖
share responsibility for the establishment of an effective compliance and
ethics program.301 For a corporation‘s program to qualify as an effective
compliance and ethics program, high-level personnel must ensure that the
organization has a program, and specific individuals within this group must

296. See Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 57) (describing anonymous reporting as an
―important way‖ to reduce the fear of retribution); Moberly, supra note 206, at 1143 (finding that
because Sarbanes-Oxley allows anonymous reporting of wrongdoing, ―employees‘ fear of
retaliation should be minimized‖).
297. See Cherry, supra note 45, at 1074 (noting the use of anonymous hotlines); Lobel, supra
note 44 (manuscript at 57) (same); see also Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93
VA. L. REV. 853, 864 (2007) (noting that as part of its settlement agreement with the federal
government, accounting firm KPMG agreed to establish a hotline to encourage internal
whistleblowing). For an example of such a hotline, see Ernst & Young‘s web-based EY/Ethics
Hotline, https://secure.ethicspoint.com/domain/en/report_custom.asp?clientid=6483 (last visited
May 19, 2009).
298. See Frederick v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 246 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2001)
(explaining that, to demonstrate that an employer took reasonable care to prevent and correct
harassment, an employer‘s policy must contain reasonable complaint procedures and that the
employer must have taken reasonable steps to correct the harassment); see also supra note 271
and accompanying text. The affirmative defense is available only where the harassment has not
resulted in a tangible employment action and where the employee has unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any corrective measures the employer has in place or otherwise to avoid harm.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
299. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998) (holding that the employer
could not utilize the defense because it failed to effectively disseminate its policy).
300. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(A) (2006) (providing that an audit committee must establish
procedures for ―the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints‖).
301. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A)–(B) (2008).
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be assigned overall responsibility for the program.302 The organization
must delegate day-to-day operational responsibility to specific individuals
within the organization, who must ―report periodically to high-level
personnel and, as appropriate, to the governing authority.‖303 In addition,
the organization‘s governing authority must be knowledgeable about the
content and operation of the program and exercise reasonable oversight
with respect to the implementation and effectiveness of the program.304
c. Application to the Legal Profession
The differences between the corporate world and the legal profession
would make it impossible to transfer the provisions of either SarbanesOxley or the OSG wholesale to the ethical rules governing lawyers. For
example, there is no direct parallel in the legal profession to the role that
independent directors play in the corporate world.305 In addition, the small
size of many law firms would make it impossible to require the kind of
accountability and monitoring structure the OSG envision. Ultimately, the
diversity within the legal profession in terms of the size and structure of law
firms makes it impossible to establish a ―one-size-fits-all‖ rule.306
Nonetheless, there are certainly lessons that the legal profession can learn
from corporate law in terms of amending Rule 5.1 to provide for more
meaningful obligations with respect to the development of ethical
infrastructures.
Rule 5.1 should be rewritten to dispense with the vague ―reasonable
efforts‖ language and to make explicit the requirement that firms develop
ethical infrastructures. Borrowing from the OSG,307 law firms should be
required to develop an effective compliance and ethics program. A
program would be effective when it is reasonably designed, implemented,
and enforced so that it generally will be effective in assisting all lawyers in
the firm in the ethical practice of law and in preventing and detecting
unethical conduct.308 The nature of an effective compliance and ethics
program would, of course, vary depending upon the size and structure of a
firm. A firm consisting of a husband and wife with no associates could
302. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(B).
303. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C).
304. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A).
305. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
306. See Chambliss & Wilkins, A New Framework, supra note 240, at 345 (―[T]here is little
prospect of defining structural standards that make sense for all firms.‖).
307. See supra note 291 and accompanying text (describing how the OSG requires
corporations to develop effective ethics programs and increases or decreases criminal penalties
based on the existence of such programs).
308. See supra note 292–294 and accompanying text (describing requirements of an effective
compliance and ethics program under the OSG).
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hardly be expected to develop the same types of formal structures that a
much larger firm could. However, an effective program would, at a
minimum, have certain characteristics.309
First, the legal profession should follow the example of SarbanesOxley and the OSG and require that law firms—regardless of size—
designate an individual partner or group of partners within the firm as
having responsibility for the development and overall administration of a
firm‘s ethical infrastructure.310 In addition to providing a measure of
accountability, this requirement would force firms to focus on and
adequately fund their compliance procedures.311 In keeping with the OSG,
the individuals designated with responsibility for developing and
administering a firm‘s compliance program should be required to report
periodically to the partnership (or firm leadership, such as a managing
partner or management committee). All partners within a firm should also
be required to be knowledgeable about the firm‘s compliance procedures
and exercise reasonable oversight regarding the implementation and
effectiveness of the program. These requirements should help prevent the
firm‘s decisionmakers and, more generally, its partners from remaining
ignorant of the firm‘s ethics structures and address the concerns about
encouraging partners to shirk their oversight responsibilities.312
In advocating for a similar approach, Professors Chambliss and
Wilkins concluded that, based on their research, designated in-house
compliance specialists ―play a significant role in promoting ethical

309. For an example of a firm compliance program, see Davis, supra note 18, at 125–31.
310. See supra notes 300–304 and accompanying text. A similar requirement exists in
Australia. In New South Wales, Australia, legal service providers are permitted to form
Incorporated Legal Practices (―ILPs‖), which enable the organization ―to incorporate and provide
legal services either alone or alongside other legal service providers who may, or may not be
‗legal practitioners.‘‖ Steven Mark & Georgina Cowdroy, Incorporated Legal Practices—A New
Era in the Provision of Legal Services in the State of New South Wales, 22 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV.
671, 671 (2004). An ILP must designate at least one legal practitioner as a ―solicitor director,‖
who, in addition to being responsible for the management of the legal services provided by the
ILP, is responsible for ensuring that the ILP has ―appropriate management systems‖ in place to
ensure that legal services are provided in a competent and ethical manner. See id. at 681–87
(describing the duties of solicitor directors).
311. See Chambliss & Wilkins, A New Framework, supra note 240, at 348–49 (stating that the
requirement to identify a specific, responsible partner would provide an incentive for managers to
focus on compliance efforts and help the law firm justify the cost of investing in proactive
compliance efforts).
312. See David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes-Oxley and the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1781, 1808 (2007) (stating that OSG‘s
requirements ―should go a long way in ensuring that the top management and the board of
directors are not ‗out of touch‘ with the ethical environment of the organization‖); supra note
263–265 and accompanying text (discussing concerns that imposing a firm-wide duty under Rule
5.1 would encourage shirking of individual responsibility).
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awareness and the quality of structural controls within firms.‖313 A firm‘s
designation of such individuals imposes a measure of accountability on a
firm‘s compliance procedure as well as further investing firms in the
compliance process.314
The specific measures that the designated
individual or individuals implement may vary widely depending upon the
size and structure of a firm.315 Research suggests, however, that the more
the measures become integrated within a firm, the more likely partners and
associates are to utilize the measures.316
Another component of an effective compliance and ethics program
would be the establishment of measures to encourage firm attorneys to
make internal reports of suspected unethical conduct on the part of other
attorneys and to seek guidance concerning their own ethical obligations
without fear of retaliation.317 The existence of a formal policy encouraging
reports and inquiries concerning ethical obligations would help promote an
organizational culture and atmosphere that values compliance with ethical
norms in a more direct manner than Rule 5.1 currently does.318
Admittedly, in some firms—such as a small firm with no junior attorneys—
it may make little sense to have an internal reporting policy. Ordinarily,
however, the existence of an internal reporting policy should be considered
an essential part of an effective compliance and ethics program. Borrowing
from the OSG and employment discrimination law, law firms should also
be required by rule to respond appropriately to any requests for guidance or
reports of suspected misconduct they receive, including, where appropriate,
disciplining an attorney who has engaged in misconduct.319
The nature of a firm‘s program could easily vary, depending upon the
nature of the firm. For example, confidential or anonymous reporting might
313. Chambliss & Wilkins, A New Framework, supra note 240, at 347.
314. Id. at 348–49.
315. See generally Chambliss & Wilkins, The Emerging Role, supra note 122, at 576–83
(describing the effect of firm size on the extent to which firms invest in in-house compliance
specialists and other ethical infrastructure).
316. See id. at 580–83 (discussing the willingness of partners to seek out the services of a fulltime ethics specialist and the consequent willingness of associates to do the same). For this
reason, ethics compliance should be the primary job responsibility of this individual where
resources permit. This makes it more likely that firm lawyers—particularly associates—will view
the individual as being quasi-independent and, therefore, view the individual as a legitimate
resource. See Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 57) (explaining that the presence of quasiindependent compliance professionals can make employees more comfortable utilizing internal
procedures).
317. See Davis, supra note 18, at 106 (arguing that ―law firms need clearly defined reporting
procedures‖); supra notes 294–297 and accompanying text.
318. Cf. supra note 290 and accompanying text (noting OSG‘s emphasis on promoting
organizational cultures that encourage ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the
law).
319. See supra notes 290–293, 298–299 and accompanying text.
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be impossible for smaller firms. At a minimum, however, any internal
reporting procedure would ordinarily have to do the following in order to
satisfy the amended rule:
(1) encourage firm lawyers to seek guidance as to their ethical
obligations and report suspected unethical conduct on the part of
other firm lawyers;
(2) provide assurance of protection from retaliation for those who
take such action;
(3) provide a means whereby firm lawyers may take such action,
including a system of confidential reporting and reporting to
individuals other than immediate supervisors where practicable;
(4) provide for effective investigation; and
(5) provide for prompt and effective response, including internal
320
discipline where appropriate.
In order to fulfill the purposes of Rule 5.1, it is essential that law firms
have formal structures in place to handle ethics questions and reports of
suspected misconduct. Firms must also effectively promote these structures
and encourage attorneys to utilize them without fear of retaliation.
According to Professor Orly Lobel, ―[e]mployees are more likely to use
internal procedures when the procedures are formally established and the
corporation asserts its commitment to a fair process.‖321 Consequently, it is
essential that law firms provide assurance of protection from retaliation
where an attorney reports suspected wrongdoing on the part of another or
raises concerns about the attorney‘s ethical obligations.322 All law firms,
regardless of size, should also have measures in place to ensure that firm
attorneys can seek guidance when confronted with difficult ethical issues.
320. Cf. Marc I. Steinberg & Seth A. Kaufman, Minimizing Corporate Liability Exposure
When the Whistle Blows in the Post Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 30 J. CORP. L. 445, 457 (2005) (listing
measures necessary for an effective complaint procedure under Sarbanes-Oxley).
321. Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 57).
322. In his excellent article on legal ethics and risk management, Anthony E. Davis provides,
in an appendix, parts of his firm‘s risk management policies. Under these written policies, all
attorneys in the firm have an obligation to report suspected misconduct on the part of another
attorney. The list of types of misconduct that must be reported under the policy is fairly lengthy
(for example, ―any known or suspected instance of alcohol or other substance abuse‖). Davis,
supra note 18, at 126. Thus, the reporting obligation is quite extensive. Nothing in the policy
contained in the appendix, however, provides lawyers of the firm with any assurance that they will
not suffer adverse consequences if they make such a report. Thus, firm lawyers must report many
forms of misconduct (and some forms that they might not be ethically obligated to do under the
Model Rules), but if they do, they have no assurance they will not be fired for doing so. From the
perspective of an attorney in the firm (particularly an associate), this seems like the worst of all
possible worlds. It is worth noting once again that this is similar to the approach that the legal
profession as a whole takes with respect to external reporting of lawyer misconduct, and the
results there have hardly been a success. See supra notes 50–60 and accompanying text
(discussing instances in which attorneys have been fired for reporting or threatening to report
unethical conduct and the general reluctance of attorneys to make external reports of misconduct).
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Although it might not be practicable for smaller firms to have a designated
ethics ―expert‖ to whom lawyers may refer ethics questions, smaller firms
might be able to satisfy the requirement by directing firm lawyers with
ethics-related questions to utilize the bar-approved legal ethics hotlines that
exist in many jurisdictions in consultation with the individual or individuals
in the firm charged with administration of the firm‘s ethical
infrastructure.323
In order to encourage internal reporting and inquiries, firms should,
where feasible, develop reporting and inquiry procedures that allow
attorneys to bypass the traditional chains of command. Attorneys may be
less likely to raise concerns about their own ethical dilemmas or the
suspected misconduct of other attorneys to their direct supervisors or
managing partners who have substantial control over the fate of the
attorney‘s career. Similarly, information may be less likely to flow up the
chain of command than where there is a designated, semi-independent point
person outside the normal chain of command.324 As an example, many
larger law firms currently designate an attorney within the firm as the
designated point person for ethics-related questions.325
The investigation and resolution obligations are also critical. Firm
attorneys—and associates in particular—are less likely to report suspected
wrongdoing if they do not believe their concerns will be taken seriously.326
By requiring law firms to investigate suspected misconduct and take their
own disciplinary action against offending attorneys, the legal profession can
encourage firms to internalize their ethical obligations to a greater extent
than they are currently required. The requirement would have benefits for
the disciplinary process as well. The fact that a firm has investigated and
disciplined an attorney would not eliminate the independent duty under
Rule 8.3 to make an external report to disciplinary authorities.327 In many
instances, however, it might obviate the need for disciplinary authorities to
devote significant resources to their own investigation into misconduct.
Finally, an effective compliance and ethics program would internalize
systems and procedures reasonably designed to enable firm attorneys to
323. For examples of state bar hotlines, see State Bar of California Ethics Hotline,
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar_generic.jsp?cid=10131 (last visited May 19, 2009),
and State Bar of Georgia—Ethics Helpline, http://www.gabar.org/ethics/ethics_helpline_faqs/
(last visited May 19, 2009).
324. See supra notes 283–288 and accompanying text.
325. See Chambliss & Wilkins, The Emerging Role, supra note 122, at 559 (discussing the
growth in the use of in-house ethics advisors in large firms).
326. See Moberly, supra note 206, at 1144 (stating that ―[s]tudies of whistleblowers
demonstrate that an even larger concern than retaliation is the fear that nothing will be done in
response to a whistleblowing complaint‖).
327. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2008) (setting forth the attorney‘s
ethical obligation to report the misconduct of another attorney).
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practice in a competent and ethical manner. The comments to Rule 5.1
already reference this idea by suggesting that firms utilize procedures
―designed to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by which
actions must be taken in pending matters, account for client funds and
property and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly supervised.‖328
At least one item in the list needs greater emphasis: supervision of
inexperienced lawyers. Although the means of supervision may vary
depending upon the size and structure of a firm, the comments should be
amended to place greater emphasis on the need for meaningful supervision
and the means by which it may be accomplished.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, it is something of an embarrassment that the legal
profession does not do more to encourage firm lawyers to raise concerns
within their firms about suspected misconduct and protect those who
comply with their ethical obligations to report serious misconduct to
disciplinary authorities. Although there is considerable disparity in the law
concerning the extent of protection that should be afforded to internal
versus external whistleblowers who report suspected violations of the law,
protection from retaliation is increasingly viewed as vital if the goals
underlying the law in question are to be advanced. Adverse views toward
internal whistleblowers are changing and, in many instances, the law
reflects this. In the corporate world, there is increasing recognition that
internal structures designed to foster a culture of ethical behavior and
encourage employees with knowledge of corporate misfeasance to share
that information internally are to be encouraged. Yet, the legal profession,
while paying lip service to these ideas, has done little as a practical matter
to advance them.
In order to provide reasonable assurance to the public at large that law
firms are places where ethics are taken seriously, the legal profession
should take steps to provide protection for lawyers who raise reasonable,
good faith concerns about possible misconduct occurring within the firm.
This can be accomplished in any number of ways. At the most conservative
level, disciplinary authorities could simply enforce existing disciplinary
rules to prohibit legal employers from attempting to intimidate or retaliate
against would-be whistleblowers. In terms of a holistic approach that
addresses not just the issue of retaliation against whistleblowers but the
development of meaningful ethical infrastructures within law firms, firms
should be required to establish more formal procedures for promoting the
ethical practice of law, including the receipt, investigation, and resolution of
internal reports of unethical conduct.
328. Id. R. 5.1 cmt. 2.
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